Fun with Dick and Jane and Lawrence: A Primer on Education Privacy as Constitutional Liberty by Stuart, Susan P.
Marquette Law Review
Volume 88
Issue 3 Winter 2004 Article 2
Fun with Dick and Jane and Lawrence: A Primer
on Education Privacy as Constitutional Liberty
Susan P. Stuart
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Marquette Law Review by an authorized administrator of Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact
megan.obrien@marquette.edu.
Repository Citation
Susan P. Stuart, Fun with Dick and Jane and Lawrence: A Primer on Education Privacy as Constitutional Liberty, 88 Marq. L. Rev. 563
(2004).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr/vol88/iss3/2
FUN WITH DICK AND JANE AND
LAWRENCE: A PRIMER ON EDUCATION
PRIVACY AS CONSTITUTIONAL LIBERTY
SUSAN P. STUART*
Efforts to quantify and qualify a constitutional right to privacy are not
unlike the travails of King Tantalus. The King's punishment for revealing the
secrets of the gods was to stand in a pool of water, shaded by a fruit tree. The
water receded when he thirsted, and the fruit trees retreated when he
hungered.' Likewise, the more one reads about privacy, the more one realizes
how many theories abound about the existence or nonexistence of a right to
2privacy without coming any closer to finding a sustaining theory. Privacy
law has been characterized as alternatively diverse, decentralized, and
dynamic. 3  Even more elusive are efforts to find a constitutional right of
privacy for children, minors under the age of eighteen. "The meaning of
privacy and the right to privacy for children rarely if ever enter the debates
that people wage about the ways that childcare is provided and education is
organized. ' 4
Except for the treatment of limited issues on the matter of mature minors'
privacy, 5 most scholarly work on privacy addresses exclusively adult
* Associate Professor of Law, Valparaiso University School of Law. B.A. 1973, DePauw
University; M.Ed. 1976, Valparaiso University; J.D. 1982, Indiana University-Indianapolis. I would
like to thank my stalwart research assistants, Lori Marschke and Katherine Lord, for their superior
work. And, I thank my colleagues for their helpful suggestions: Ivan Bodensteiner, Rosalie
Levinson, and Richard Stith.
1. THOMAS BULFINCH, BULFINCH'S MYTHOLOGY 270, 948 (1989).
2. E.g., DAVID M. O'BRIEN, PRIVACY, LAW, & PUBLIC POLICY 4 (1979); see generally THE
RIGHT TO PRIVACY (Ellen Frankel Paul et al. eds., 2000); David Bazelon, Probing Privacy, 12
GONZ. L. REV. 587, 588 (1977). In addition, the egocentrism of legal analysts insists on formulating
new and unique theories where long-recognized principles might work as well. Ken Gormley, One
Hundred Years of Privacy, 1992 Wis. L. REV. 1335, 1338 (1992); see also JULIE C. INNESS,
PRIVACY, INTIMACY, AND ISOLATION 3 (1992) (describing the numerous theories of privacy as a
"swamp"); Daniel J. Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1087, 1088-89 (2002).
3. E.g., Dorothy Glancy, At the Intersection of Visible and Invisible Worlds: United States
Privacy Law and the Internet, 16 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 357, 358 (2000).
4. MAX VAN MANEN & BAS LEVERING, CHILDHOOD'S SECRETS: INTIMACY, PRIVACY AND
THE SELF RECONSIDERED 160 (1996).
5. See, e.g., Melinda T. Derish & Kathleen Vanden Heuvel, Mature Minors Should Have the
Right to Refuse Life-Sustaining Medical Treatment, 28 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 109 (2000); Maggie
O'Shaughnessy, Note, The Worst of Both Worlds?: Parental Involvement Requirements and the
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concerns. Instead, privacy of children is subsumed by or coextensive with the
privacy of others, usually their families. Consequently, very little legal,
scholarly literature suggests that children have---or perhaps even need-an
independent privacy right. However, to ignore the privacy concerns of
children is to ignore the one area of their lives that can be abused most by the
absence of privacy. That area is children's public school lives.
During the late 1960s and early 1970s, there was some movement in
professional education literature about the privacy of schoolchildren and the
need to better protect that privacy. This movement was the chief impetus for
the passage of the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act in 1974
("FERPA").6 FERPA amended the Elementary and Secondary Education Act
of 1965 and conditions federal funding to educational institutions on their
compliance with certain statutory requirements to protect disclosure of and
access to students' educational records. Although the legal literature suggests
some fine-tuning of FERPA's procedures and regulations to better serve
students and their families, none of that literature suggests other grounds for
asserting children's privacy in schools.7 Perhaps no one perceived the need:
FERPA set out guidelines for schools to follow in dealing with student
records, and the system went chugging along quite nicely. For a nearly thirty-
year-old statute, very few cases addressing privacy issues were actually
prosecuted under FERPA. Then the whole thing derailed when the Supreme
Court of the United States declared that FERPA granted no privacy rights to
students in Gonzaga University v. Doe.8 As a result, the cornerstone of
students' privacy rights was gone, or at least the assumption that FERPA
contained such a right was gone.
The importance of a schoolchild's having a particular right to privacy
cannot be underestimated. School is a child's "workplace" for six to eight
hours every day, but it is a workplace run by the government; hence, the
dichotomy between a child being a public customer and a private being. No
parent would suggest that everything that occurs in the school is a matter of
"public" record merely because it is a government agency, but Gonzaga
University v. Doe banished the notion that there exists any real privacy
Privacy Rights of Mature Minors, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 1731 (1996); see also Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S.
622 (1979) (abortion); Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979) (institutionalization); Planned
Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976) (abortion).
6. 20 U.S.C. § 1232g (2003).
7. See, e.g., Margaret L. O'Donnell, FERPA: Only a Piece of the Privacy Puzzle, 29 J.C. &
U.L. 679 (2003); Lynn M. Daggett, Bucking up Buckley I: Making the Federal Student Records
Statute Work, 46 CATH. U. L. REV. 617 (1997).
8. 536 U.S. 273 (2002).
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protection in schools. 9 Thus, a different formulation of children's privacy in
the public school setting must be considered.
Such a privacy right already exists as a function of the American cultural
and political condition and belongs to children no less than to adults: the
Constitution's liberty interest-in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments-
assumes the existence of citizens' privacy and the limits on governmental
interference with that privacy. The Constitution's liberty interest contains no
caveats-"Adults Only"-so it takes no stretch of the imagination to extend
that general privacy interest into a special category of education privacy for
children. As a practical matter, such privacy is a child's liberty interest in
nearly all aspects of her life because so much of that life is spent in school-
the aspects of her life when the government acts in its educational capacity.10
The necessity for addressing children's privacy in schools is imperative
because more and more inroads are being made on that private realm,
especially in the name of the schools' government function. In addition to
actual abuses of student information in violation of FERPA and random drug-
testing without probable cause, recent state and federal legislation has further
eroded student privacy, especially in increased access to otherwise
confidential student records under circumstances that most adults would find
incredibly invasive.1 Because legislative regulatory regimes, such as
FERPA, are piecemeal responses to specific privacy concerns, they do not
really address the fundamental issue-that children have a liberty interest in
privacy that exists, not at the will of the government, but in spite of the
government.
As a cognate of an adult's privacy liberty interest, a child's privacy
interest is hard to capture because of the difficulty in articulating that interest
9. There is a movement afoot to put teeth into FERPA by adding a civil remedy. See H.R. Rep.
No. 1848, 108th Cong. § 1 (2003).
10. The formulation of children's constitutional privacy in this Article does not include Fourth
Amendment search-and-seizure issues that arise when schools assume a police role, especially in
student drug-testing. Scholarly work on this issue usually addresses the Fourth Amendment as a
distinct privacy question concerning students' bodily integrity and is not usually tied to the schools'
educational function. See, e.g., Meg Penrose, Shedding Rights, Shredding Rights: A Critical
Examination of Students' Privacy Rights and the "Special Needs" Doctrine After Earls, 3 NEV. L.J.
411 (2002-03). Although the notion that drug-testing is somehow separate from the educational
function of schools is somewhat naive and ignores reality, that subject is better left to a different
discussion.
11. The U.S.A. Patriot Act amended FERPA to allow an Assistant United States Attorney, with
only an ex parte order, to collect education records considered relevant to a terrorism investigation.
20 U.S.C. § 1232j (2003). Under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, school authorities
must transmit school records-without court order or subpoena-to police agencies. Id. §
1415(k)(9)(B). And the No Child Left Behind legislation allows the military to access certain
information of students as soon as they turn sixteen, without prior parental consent. Id. § 7908.
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for adults. Perhaps we are looking at the issue backwards, in that the failure
to adequately address a child's right of privacy inherently hampers the quest
for an articulable right of privacy for adults.' 2 Whatever the confusion, the
effort to quantify and qualify constitutional privacy interests was recently
simplified when the Supreme Court produced a template for analysis in
Lawrence v. Texas.13  Indeed, Lawrence v. Texas explicitly concludes that
privacy is a constitutional liberty under the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 14  That conclusion elucidates that privacy is a
constitutionally protected sphere of conduct within which the individual is
free from government interference.
Considering the breadth of the language used by the Court in Lawrence v.
Texas, any number of privacy interests may be protected from government
interference under the aegis of constitutional liberty. Thus, this Article posits
that children are entitled to one of those protected spheres of conduct, a
distinct constitutional liberty that protects their privacy in schools. This
limited thesis does not suggest that children do not have a privacy liberty
outside of schools; indeed, a formulation of education privacy may well
inform their privacy interests outside of school. But the unique public-private
dichotomy of children in schools poses special issues that arise because of the
exclusive, nearly universal, embrace by a state actor of a private individual.
Any analysis of this privacy interest first requires a constitutional
framework for recognition of the liberty itself.15  Thus, Part I analyzes
Lawrence v. Texas's judicial methodology for recognizing this constitutional
liberty so the decision's limited holding can be extended to children. Such
analysis necessarily includes a summary of the liberty jurisprudence itself as
the foundation of the constitutional roots of privacy. Part II clarifies the
underlying premise that privacy is a constitutional liberty per se and not just a
piecemeal, case-by-case iteration that lurches from one adjudication to
another. In so doing, Part II expands upon the Lawrence v. Texas
methodology by fashioning the broader constitutional liberty of privacy per se
based on its practices, its history, and its legal traditions. Part III establishes
the practices and history of children's privacy, while Part IV explores the
12. On the other hand, the failure may be an inability of legal language to quantify or to qualify
privacy as a consistent, legal precept. For example, courts speak of "expectations" of privacy with
regard to searches and seizures but with wildly differing opinions on what an expectation is. See,
e.g., Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie County v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 831-32
(2002). However, attributing an "expectation" to a child is difficult, if not impossible, at ages other
than high schoolers, who were the subjects of the drug-testing in Earls.
13. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
14. Id.
15. The legislative attempts to ameliorate privacy concerns in schools and the failures of those
attempts are multitudinous and the subject of a companion article.
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inherent function of American education and its mission to encourage
schoolchildren's privacy as a function of both their development and their
civic responsibilities. Last, Part V postulates the basic contours of education
privacy for schoolchildren in the two primary areas of concern: the public
classroom and their private information.
I. THE LESSONS OF LAWRENCE V. TEXAS'
6
Lawrence v. Texas may well be that case changing the landscape of
substantive due process-the characterization of particular rights arising from
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 17 The case has been
described as an anomalous decision, departing from both the approach of
defining and protecting "traditional" fundamental rights and the approach of
protecting citizens' autonomy from governmental interference.' 8  The
"traditional" approach requires there be proof of specific recognition of a
fundamental, particularized right through "history, legal traditions, and
practices" before a court may afford it constitutional protection. 19  The
autonomist approach, on the other hand, requires "respect for the liberty of the
individual" without a pronouncement of a particularized right and presumes
an individual is free to act in the absence of some compelling government
interest.20 The two approaches have clearly been at political (and arguably
cultural) odds with each other for some time. Lawrence v. Texas serves as the
Court's "bridge" between these two analyses of substantive due process.
In Lawrence, the Court faced a state regulation of private conduct-
sodomy-between homosexuals. 21 The traditionalists argued-as previously
set out in Bowers v. Hardwick2 2-that there is no fundamental right to engage
in homosexual conduct because historical precedent forbade the act of
16. The analytical progression of Lawrence v. Texas is the template for proving a children's
constitutional right of privacy because it is the most contemporaneous and was fashioned by the
Court. Other historical studies of constitutional privacy are available. See, e.g., DARIEN A.
MCWHIRTER & JON D. BIBLE, PRIVACY AS A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT: SEX, DRUGS, AND THE
RIGHT TO LIFE 59-105 (1992); ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 330-364 (1970);
Gormley, supra note 2 (a nearly encyclopedic compendium of the law of privacy).
17. Robert C. Post, Forward: Fashioning the Legal Constitution: Culture, Courts and Law, 117
HARV. L. REV. 4, 96-97 (2003).
18. Id. at 89.
19. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997); see also Post, supra note 17, at 91-
94.
20. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting); see also Post, supra note
17, at 85-88.
21. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 563 (2003).
22. 478 U.S. 186, 192 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
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sodomy; thus, the government may interfere at will.23  The Bowers v.
Hardwick autonomists-its dissenters-argued historical precedent had no
place in fashioning this constitutional privacy interest and would have
protected the behavior under the "right to be let alone ' 24 within the "private
sphere of individual liberty.",25 Lawrence v. Texas bridged the difference by
usurping the traditionalist approach-the use of history, practices, and legal
tradition-to support the autonomist perspective that the right to be let alone
in private homosexual conduct without governmental interference has
historical antecedents.
A. The Theorem of Lawrence v. Texas
Integral to the disputing approaches is the distinct recognition of "liberty"
as a substantive right in the Constitution (autonomists) in contrast to the more
limited, constitutional recognition of a specific "fundamental right"
(traditionalists). The Lawrence Court did not elucidate a "fundamental right"
to homosexual conduct; however, it did recognize the liberty not to be
prosecuted for homosexual conduct.26 Hence, privacy is transformed into a
constitutional liberty while "fundamental right" is transformed into liberty's
handmaiden, the right to be free from governmental interference with that
liberty. The majority opinion clearly indicates that the underlying postulate
now is the presumption of liberty from government interference and not the
presumption of the correctness of government interference in the absence of a
clearly articulated, affirmative right.
In fleshing out that theorem, Justice Kennedy co-opted the traditionalist
approach when he made at least three distinct forays into history in the
majority opinion in Lawrence v. Texas. The first foray occurred when he
delineated the historical legal tradition and practices of a narrow substantive
liberty interest of private sexuality under the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.2 7 He engaged in two additional forays into history as
he attacked Bowers v. Hardwick by noting that its contrary precedent had no
support under legal traditions and practices of anti-homosexuality legislation2 8
and anti-homosexuality policy. 29 Thus, the Court fashioned a constitutional
liberty of privacy that protects homosexual conduct from governmental
23. See generally Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 597-99.
24. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 199 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
25. Id. at 203-04.
26. Id.
27. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 563-65.
28. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 566-69.
29. Id. at 569-73.
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interference not because there were affirmations that such a right existed but
because, historically, there had been no governmental prohibitions.
John Geddes Lawrence and Tyron Gamer were engaged in consensual,
intimate, homosexual conduct when county police officers entered their
apartment. 30 They were arrested for and pleaded nolo contendere to charges
of "deviate sexual intercourse," a criminal offense only when committed
between persons of the same sex. 31 The focus of their defense was an attack
on the constitutionality of the Texas criminal statute. Unsuccessful in the
state courts, Lawrence and Garner ultimately prevailed in the Supreme Court.
The source of their success is the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, protecting citizens' life, liberty, and property from state
interference. In that clause, the Court determined that there exists a privacy
right extrapolated from the specifically enumerated liberty interest and
specifically held:
The petitioners are entitled to respect for their private lives. The State
cannot demean their existence [n]or control their destiny by making
their private sexual conduct a crime. Their right to liberty under the
Due Process Clause gives them the full right to engage in their
conduct without intervention of the government. 32
Specifically, the Court determined that homosexuals have the right to choose
the form of their relationships free from government interference and, thereby,
to choose the conduct that defines the relationship. 33 Absent injury to others,
the liberty to make such a choice and engage in such conduct is outside the
purview of state control.34
In Justice Kennedy's first historical foray in support of that result, he
derived the backbone for this wide-ranging notion of liberty and privacy from
a contemporary chronology of substantive due process cases, most dealing
with opinions concerning intimate sexual behavior. The geneses of the
chronology used by Kennedy were Pierce v. Society of the Sisters35 and Meyer
v. Nebraska.36 The Court then began its exegesis in earnest on the substantive
liberty principle with Griswold v. Connecticut37 and its sexuality progeny.
30. Id. at 561-64.
31. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.06(a) (Vernon 2003).
32. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
36. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
37. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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The Court extracted from Griswold v. Connecticut the "right of privacy" as a
protected interest, in particular, the protection from government interference
in the use of contraceptives.38 Wending its way through Eisenstadt v.
Baird39-another case concerning contraceptives-the Court then addressed
Roe v. Wade4 0 for the proposition that a woman's decision to have an abortion
deserved protection as a function of her exercise of the liberty interest in the
Due Process Clause.4' In so doing, the Court especially emphasized Roe v.
Wade's analysis that expanded the individual's freedom beyond spatial
considerations. 42 After citing Carey v. Population Services Internationa43 for
the point that the liberty interest of the earlier cases extended to minors,44 the
Court reached the 1986 chronological position for Bowers v. Hardwick, which
upheld Georgia's anti-sodomy law in the face of a constitutional challenge.
And the Court overruled it.
45
The Court's rejection of Bowers rested on two distinct notions: That the
Court had previously failed to recognize the breadth of the liberty interest at
stake and that its historical premises were incorrect. First, in the matter of the
liberty interest, the original analysis in Bowers examined whether specific
sexual conduct-sodomy-was protected by the Due Process Clause.46
However, the actual prosecution in Bowers was limited to homosexual
sodomy.47 Thus, the Bowers Court wrongly narrowed its focus and should
instead have examined the selective prosecution of homosexuality, not just of
the sexual conduct. Justice Kennedy, analogizing the institutional relationship
of marriage as something more than just the "right to have sexual
intercourse," extended due process protection to the nature of the relationship,
not just the sexual behavior, and determined that a state's criminalizing
sodomy unconstitutionally affects the choice of relationships between
homosexuals and interferes with their private lives and dignity as free
38. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 565.
39. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
40. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
41. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 565.
42. Id.
43. 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
44. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 566.
45. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 572; see David A. J. Richards, Constitutional Legitimacy and
Constitutional Privacy, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 800, 801 (1986) (positing that Bowers v. Hardwick was
wrongly decided); accord Brett J. Williamson, Note, The Constitutional Privacy Doctrine After
Bowers v. Hardwick: Rethinking the Second Death of Substantive Due Process, 62 S. CAL. L. REV.
1297, 1298 (1989).
46. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567.
47. Id.
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persons.4 8 Having made that leap, the Court recognized that privacy as liberty
encompasses more than just discrete types of behavior and does more than
cast certain conduct as a fundamental right. Thus, the Court found wanting
the fundamental underpinnings in Bowers and adopted a different formula for
analyzing the Texas statute.
In extending its attack on Bowers, the Court's second and third forays into
historical analysis were specifically aimed at discrediting the evidence relied
on by the Bowers Court, its legal traditions and its historical premises.
Instead, the Lawrence Court continued the conduct-relationship distinction in
re-examining the historical traditions of sodomy, but this time focused on the
governmental regulation of homosexuality as warranted by the facts, not just
on the historical regulation of sodomy in general. First, with regard to legal
traditions and practices of the proscribed sexual conduct, the historical
treatment showed that English criminal laws had prohibited sodomy since at
least 1533.49 However, such "crime-against-nature" laws in both England and
America criminalized heterosexual as well as homosexual conduct.5 °
Historically, such laws were designed to protect minors of both sexes from
predatory acts of adults,5 but there was no discernible, historical tradition of
prosecuting only homosexuals for sodomy. Second, the historical treatment
noted that this Nation's anti-homosexuality regulation does not have "ancient
roots. 52 Prohibitions against peculiarly homosexual conduct did not appear
in America until the late nineteenth century-postdating the Fourteenth
Amendment-and, even then, were not enforced against consenting adults
engaged in private conduct. 53 Not until the 1970s did states begin to target
54homosexual relationships and to criminalize their sexual conduct. As a
consequence of this narrower historical survey, the Court determined that
Bowers's limited recitation of historical tradition was incorrect.
55
In addition, the Court relied on two interregnum cases to cast further
doubt on Bowers's continued vitality. First, the Court quoted Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,56 emphasizing that the
Due Process liberty interest cast broad constitutional protection over
individual autonomy in marriage, family relationships, education, and child-
48. Id.
49. Id. at 568.
50. Id. at 568-69.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 568.
53. Id. at 568.
54. Id. at 570.
55. Id. at 571.
56. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
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rearing:
These matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices a
person may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and
autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment. At the heart of liberty is the right to define one's own
concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery
of human life. Beliefs about these matters could not define the
attributes of personhood were they formed under compulsion of the
State.57
Second, and more of a statement on changing public policy, the Court
cited Romer v. Evans,58 which held that targeting homosexuals as a class of
individuals unworthy of protection has no rational relationship to a legitimate
governmental purpose. 59  Based on the foregoing analysis and historical
antecedents, the Court held that the Texas statute unlawfully intruded into the
personal and private lives of the homosexual defendants for no legitimate
state purpose.
60
The Lawrence v. Texas decision makes many important points about a
discrete sexual behavior and a targeted relationship, but it goes much further
than just striking down one statute and protecting a particular type of conduct.
This decision also has broad implications in the construct of constitutional
privacy derived from the Due Process Clause's liberty interest and is
unapologetic in its sweeping statements about liberty and privacy:
Liberty protects the person from unwarranted government intrusions
into a dwelling or other private places. In our tradition the State is not
omnipresent in the home. And there are other spheres of our lives and
existence, outside the home, where the State should not be a dominant
presence. Freedom extends beyond spatial bounds. Liberty presumes
an autonomy of self that includes freedom of thought, belief,
expression, and certain intimate conduct... [with] spatial and more
57. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 574 (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 851).
58. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
59. As the Court explained, implicit in laws that have such targets is the invitation to stigmatize
the targeted group and thereby demean its individual members. Such stigma would have
consequences ranging far beyond the prosecution for sodomy, including registration on sex offenders
lists and notation on job applications. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 575. However, the Court declined to
address the alternative Equal Protection argument for striking down the Texas statute. It opined that
a decision on those grounds would have limited efficacy: the states would simply recriminalize
sodomy between heterosexuals, and the problem would again be before the courts. Id.
60. Id. at 578-79.
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transcendent dimensions.6'
By so stating, the Court spurned the traditionalist dimension of
substantive due process that requires specific constitutional recognition of a
fundamental right and relied instead on the broader and more inclusive notion
of unenumerated fundamental components to the enumerated constitutional
liberty:
Had those who drew and ratified the Due Process Clauses of the
Fifth Amendment or the Fourteenth Amendment known the
components of liberty in its manifold possibilities, they might have
been more specific. They did not presume to have this insight. They
knew times can blind us to certain truths and later generations can
see that laws once thought necessary and proper in fact serve only to
oppress. As the Constitution endures, persons in every generation
can invoke its principles in their own search for greater freedom.
62
Thus, these broad pronouncements presage a recognition of constitutional
privacy for its own sake, not just as an adjunct of a generalized constitutional
liberty against governmental interference.
In particular, the Court's reasoning broadens the notion of privacy from
three distinct spheres-bodily integrity, decisionmaking, and even
information-to a recognition of personhood 63 (or autonomy) and all its
spiritual, mental, and philosophical dimensions. Rather than confine its
language to address whether Lawrence and Garner were making choices about
their conduct, were reaching decisions about the nature of their relationship,
or were protecting their bodily integrity, the Court threw its net over a much
broader concept. Privacy, as a constitutional liberty, bloomed to full
autonomy from any particularized conduct.
61. Id. at 562; see also SANDRA PETRONIO, BOUNDARIES OF PRIVACY: DIALECTICS OF
DISCLOSURE 5 (2002). "Intimacy is the feeling or state of knowing someone deeply in physical,
psychological, emotional, and behavioral ways because that person is significant in one's life.
Private disclosure, on the other hand, concerns the process of telling and reflects the content of
private information about others and us." Id. at 6 (emphasis in original).
62. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578-79.
63. See also Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 HARV. L. REV. 737, 752-54 (1989).
Rubenfeld's exploration into personhood as the transmogrification of privacy is confined primarily to
the privacy of decisionmaking. He presents personhood as intertwining the freedom to define oneself
with the concern for personal identity. Id. at 753. Thus, according to this analysis, personhood as a
quantifiable privacy concept is the product resulting from conformity with the law rather than from
the state's regulation of behavior. Id. at 783.
2004]
MARQUE7TE LA W REVIEW
B. Constitutional Liberty: The Postulate of Lawrence v. Texas
Extrapolating more encompassing notions of constitutional privacy from
Lawrence v. Texas obviously requires a greater clarification of the underlying
principle of constitutional liberty. Without that underlying principle, the
formula for recognizing educational privacy falls apart. The Lawrence Court
tacitly acknowledged the absence of historical tradition to liberty's lineaments
by observing obliquely that perhaps that absence was deliberate: "Had those
who drew and ratified the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth Amendment or the
Fourteenth Amendment known the components of liberty in its manifold
possibilities, they might have been more specific. 64 But perhaps that is the
very point, that liberty in the American tradition does and should lack
definition and enumeration. Therefore, any analysis of the historical tradition
of liberty must account for that absence of specificity.
Constitutional liberty is expressly enumerated in the Due Process Clauses
of both the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments: "No person shall be...
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." 65 Pursuant
to these Amendments, "liberty" is protected from both state and federal
governmental deprivation without "due process of law.",6 6  However, the
precise definition of "liberty"-as well as of "due process of law"-has been
the source of dispute that goes to the very core of the Constitution itself.
"Liberty" is that which is embraced by the autonomists; "due process of law"
is embraced by traditionalists. Although a necessarily imprecise-and
somewhat result-oriented--caricature, the autonomist presumes the historical
and legal tradition of liberty, while the traditionalist presumes the historical
and legal tradition of governmental regulation. Hence, an underlying tension
in the legal recognition of constitutional privacy law is a rights-liberty
distinction. Lawrence v. Texas came down on the liberty side of the dispute.
Constitutional liberty is not easily described, but does have a strong
historical tradition. The traditional, American concept of liberty is based on
the autonomy of the individual from the government. 67 Liberty, as the right to
64. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.
65. U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV.
66. Id. Because schools are regulated by both state and federal governments, the same liberty
should be available to children under both the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.
67. The scope of this Article does not lend itself to a more in-depth analysis of the
philosophical and theoretical bases for distinguishing among law and rights and liberty. See, e.g.,
ANNABEL S. BRETT, LIBERTY, RIGHT AND NATURE: INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS IN LATER SCHOLASTIC
THOUGHT (1997). However, Thomas Hobbes envisioned liberty as an attribute of the nation-state,
not of the individual. QUENTIN SKINNER, LIBERTY BEFORE LIBERALISM 60, 61 (1998). His
underlying assumption was that an individual could only be free in a free state. Id. Hobbes placed
no faith in man but in the forces of government to control man. Thus, law coerces the individual to
act for fear of the consequences of disobedience so the individual "freely" gives up the will to
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be left alone vis A vis the government, is "the fundamental freedom not to
have one's life too totally determined by a progressively more normalizing
state."6 8  Indeed, any legal or otherwise governmental recognition of
affirmative attributes of liberty--or autonomy-would likely entail defining
the parameters of psycho-biological presumptions of personhood and might
endanger the social concept of identity, thus endangering the concept of
liberty itself.69 As a result of the American emphasis on autonomy, the
tradition of American liberty, and hence privacy, was based on what the
government could not do, not on a quantifiable, personal attribute that could
be called a right. Thus, the liberty tradition developed out of a freedom from
state interference and regulation.
At its most fundamental political application, the liberty tradition traces its
roots to the political movement in England that sought to eradicate the
absolutism of its early seventeenth-century Stuart monarchs, who sought to
re-establish the divine right of kings after the reign of Elizabeth C7  This
nascent movement arose from the contemporary Renaissance philosophers in
England, particularly those embracing the ideas of neo-Roman republican
government. 7' Such unrest eventually culminated in the second English Civil
War and the rule of law through a republican Parliament under Oliver
Cromwell and the Roundheads. Despite its eventual restoration, the English
monarchy was never quite the same, becoming a constitutional monarchy with
a Parliament that assumed more political power.72 However, one of the most
enduring products of these English philosophers was the notion that freedom
is a state of nature-a natural right-that the government is responsible for
protecting and upholding.73 That natural right, or freedom, is invested with
disobey under the rule of law. Id. at 6-8. Hobbes therefore espoused authority over liberty. D. D.
Raphael, Hobbes, in CONCEPTIONS OF LIBERTY IN POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 27, 27 (Zbigniew
Pelczynski & John Gray eds., 1984). Hobbes's philosophy, it seems, was contrived as a counterpoise
to the liberalism of the republican tradition espoused by Niccolo Machiavelli. SKINNER, supra, at 10.
In contrast to Hobbes's notion that liberty is subject to the will of the government, Machiavelli
"heretically" believed that individual freedom is a benefit of a well-ordered government. Id. at 18.
68. Rubenfeld, supra note 63, at 784; Solove, supra note 2, at 1119.
69. Rubenfeld, supra note 63, at 758, 790.
70. E.g., LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT: THE RIGHT AGAINST
SELF-INCRIMINATION 331 (1968).
71. The neo-Roman philosophers spoke in terms of "unconstrained enjoyment of a number of
specific civil rights." SKINNER, supra note 67, at 18.
72. Id. at 16.
73. Id. at 19. English philosopher Marchmont Nedham, in 1767, ascribed a particular
responsibility to government to "secure enjoyment" of these "natural rights and liberties." 1d. at 20.
In the American tradition, these "natural rights" might have been more theoretical than actual in
influencing the drafting of the Constitution. See, e.g., JOHN PHILLIP REID, 1 CONSTITUTIONAL
HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION: THE AUTHORITY OF LAW 90-95 (1986). Nonetheless,
these natural rights coincide with the rights of Englishmen and thus also possessed by the Framers.
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citizens' "equal right to ... lives, liberties and estates. '74
The flight of colonists from England to America was the existential
manifestation of this philosophy of freedom and liberty, and by their
departure, those colonists liberalized that philosophy. 75 Early colonists were,
of course, settled in America before the English Civil Wars, but they were
acutely aware of events taking place within their "homeland" government.76
However, colonial administrations of that homeland government increasingly
reflected these principles of natural rights, or liberties, as the colonies became
both philosophically and economically estranged from England, shifting from
their fealty to a king-centered government to their engagement in individual-
centered communities. 77 "The vital new controlling spirit-which saw the
state existing to further the ends of the individual-would not acquire the
necessary legal structure to clothe itself until the Revolution, but it did exert a
growing influence upon [colonial] society. 78 And although there is no exact
equation between the English legal precepts and those adapted by the
colonies,79 the colonists worked under the assumption that English liberties
were American liberties. 80 "Liberty" may have had no more definition than a
wisp of smoke to the colonists-at one point explained no more clearly than
that "power must always be proved, but liberty proves itself., 81 This vague
definition of liberty has "ancient roots," and the consequent American failure
to specify "rights" thereunder persisted with the drafting of the Constitution.
Any number of competing theories abound regarding which or whose
philosophy of liberty was adopted by the Founding Fathers and adapted to the
American political system in general and to the Constitution in particular.
74. SKINNER, supra note 67, at 20. Those "rights" included freedoms of speech, movement,
and contract. Id.
75. See also MCWHRTER & BIBLE, supra note 16, at 28 (the flight of some colonists was from
the "morality" of certain segments of the English legal system).
76. Wilcomb E. Washburn, Law and Authority in Colonial Virginia, in SELECTED ESSAYS:
LAW AND AUTHORITY IN COLONIAL AMERICA 116, 124-25 (George Athan Billias ed., 1965).
77. Id. at 128-29.
78. Id. at 129.
79. Id. at 129-30.
80. LAWRENCE H. LEDER, LIBERTY AND AUTHORITY: EARLY AMERICAN POLITICAL
IDEOLOGY 1689-1763, 125-26 (1968).
81. Id. at 126, 127. One description elaborates:
[L]iberty, once lost, is lost forever, and the liberty of the most obscure member of the
community, ought by the community to be as carefully preserved and as jealously
watched as the liberty of the member most conspicuous for honor, wealth, and the other
civil distinctions of life, because tyranny, like palsy, always first attacks the extreme parts
of the body, but never leaves it till it has possession of the heart.
Id. at 127-28.
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John Locke's theory of "natural liberty" was clearly an influence.8 2 Likewise
was the conception of "moral liberty" configured by Jean-Jacques Rousseau.
83
But the historical smorgasbord of choices was somewhat overwhelming, 84 and
no particular tradition of liberty is discernible. 85 Indeed, Alexander Hamilton
seemed to discern no particular tradition when he envisioned the presence of
"liberty" in the Constitution's preamble, thereby obviating the need for a Bill
of Rights. He believed that "We, the people of the United States, to secure the
blessing of liberty to ourselves" was sufficient recognition of individual rights
that could not be bettered by "volumes of those aphorisms which make the
principal figure in several of our State bills of rights, and which would sound
much better in a treatise of ethics than in a constitution of government., 86 His
82. FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 170-71 (1978). Locke's theory of
natural liberty envisioned that
[t]he natural liberty of man is to be free from any superior power on earth, and not to be
under the will or legislative authority of man, but to have only the law of nature for his
rule. The liberty of man, in society, is to be under no other legislative power, but that
established by consent, in the commonwealth, nor under the dominion of any will, or
restraint of any law, but what the legislative shall enact, according to the trust put in it.
James Tully, Locke on Liberty, in CONCEPTIONS OF LIBERTY IN POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 57, 58
(Zbigniew Pelczynski & John Gray eds., 1984).
83. Patrick Gardiner, Rousseau on Liberty, in CONCEPTIONS OF LIBERTY IN POLITICAL
PHILOSOPHY 83, 91 (Zbigniew Pelczynski & John Gray eds., 1984).
84. Even within the theories of natural liberty, there were competing configurations and
positions. See, e.g., Tully, supra note 82, at 61-63; see generally BRETT, supra note 67; HAYEK,
supra note 82, at 11-21.
85. John Stuart Mill's On Liberty is oft-cited as the classic resolution of the task of protecting
individual-and particularly minority-liberty in a democracy. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY
xiv (Elizabeth Rapaport ed., 1978). Mill's thesis was:
The sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering
with the liberty of action of any of their number is self-protection. That the only purpose
for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community,
against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical or moral, is
not sufficient warrant.
Id. at 9. Unfortunately, Mill meant to apply this principle only to mature individuals, not to children,
so as to protect them from injury to themselves. Id. Mill configured this principle as a sphere of
activity with three components: (1) "the inward domain of consciousness"; (2) "liberty of tastes and
pursuits ... framing the plan of our life to suit our own character"; and (3) liberty to act in concert
with others for similar pursuits. Id. at 11-12. Mill's philosophy, however, allowed for certain social
pressure to encourage improvement in certain life-choices made by others. Although such oversight
would ordinarily be anathema to notions of privacy, Mill believed privacy must be forsaken in
matters of rational improvement of the individual. See FERDINAND DAVID SCHOEMAN, PRIVACY &
SOCIAL FREEDOM 28-31 (1992). Victorian values and England's class society couldn't help but
influence Mill's consideration of who should and who should not be improved. See generally
THOMAS HARDY, JUDE THE OBSCURE (1980).
86. THE FEDERALIST No. 84, at 558-59 (Alexander Hamilton) (The Modem Library New York
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belief reflected the fear that, if the Constitution specifically enumerated
certain rights but failed to specify others, some fundamental rights would go
unrecognized and unprotected. In his mind, "liberty" filled the bill by
encompassing all the fundamental rights of Englishmen.
The debate over a Bill of Rights eventually was won by those in favor of
more specificity. But the broad perceptions of liberty played an integral role
in the substance of the Bill of Rights. Substantive concerns played an
especially significant role in the drafting of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments,
specific bulwarks protecting the individual from the power of the government.
The origins of those two amendments had more to do with substantive
issues-privacy, in particular-than they had to do with criminal procedure. 87
The Fourth Amendment was drafted to address contemporary concerns arising
from English civil law, not criminal law, in response to the English
government's intrusions into homes to investigate heresy and seditious libel
and to seize contraband in the enforcement of import laws.8 8 Similarly, the
Fifth Amendment reflected the struggle between the individual and the state
in the matter of arbitrary church and governmental inquisitorial
examinations. 89  Thus, the underlying "legislative history" of both
amendments reveals they were designed to protect certain liberties not
explicitly "enumerated" in their language. As an added protection, the
Framers added "due process of law," with its own substantive connotations. 90
Despite the substantive origins of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, 91 they
were little developed in the courts during the first 100 years of the republic
until their criminal applications transcended their civil origins. 92 During the
same time, the Ninth Amendment-the anticipated repository for
unenumerated rights-virtually withered on the vine.93 That left the courts to
1937).
87. William J. Stuntz, The Substantive Origins of Criminal Procedure, 105 YALE L.J. 393,
396-419 (1995).
88. Id. at 394, 404-06.
89. LEVY, supra note 70, at 330-32.
90. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, I AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1335, 1337 n.31 (3d ed. 2000);
Robert E. Riggs, Substantive Due Process in 1791, 1990 Wis. L. REv. 941, 991-92, 999 (1990).
91. See generally Stuntz, supra note 87.
92. Id. at419-20.
93. The Ninth Amendment was meant to ameliorate concerns about the specific enumeration of
rights in the Bill of Rights. E.g., HAYEK, supra note 82, at 185-86. "The enumeration in the
Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the
people." U.S. CONST. amend. IX. Ninth Amendment jurisprudence is rarely evoked in matters of
privacy, but when it is, it is construed to be a repository of personal rights not specifically named in
the Constitution: Madison's intention for including the Ninth Amendment was to assuage those
critics concerned that an exclusive list of specified rights would make all other "natural rights"
subject to government control. Jason S. Marks, Beyond Penumbras and Emanations: Fundamental
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other devices for formulating substantive jurisprudence that recognized
fundamental rights and constitutional liberties without their enumeration in
the Constitution.94
Such substantive jurisprudence arose out of the early constitutional
jurisprudence that limited the government's power to regulate individual
conduct. Some of these decisions were decided on "extra-constitutional"
grounds. In invalidating intrusive state statutes, the early Court variously
relied on "natural rights," governmental limits implied in the character of the
legislature, principles of "natural justice," and the like. 95  Thus, something
outside the explicit language of the Constitution impelled the Court's
decisions, something implied by the meaning and the intent of the document
rather than its literal language. And what more compelling resource for that
implied intent than its Framers' contemporaries? Thus, some of the early
Court's deliberations had all the earmarks of implying substantive rights in
the Constitution from the beginning, a legal tradition that later took full force
after the Civil War in the expansive and substantive meaning attributed to the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
96
As one of the Civil War Amendments, the Fourteenth Amendment-
whose Due Process Clause language mirrors the Fifth-made state
governments answerable to the Bill of Rights. 97  The Fourteenth
Rights, The Spirit of the Revolution, and the Ninth Amendment, 5 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 435,
437-38, 448-49 (1995). One scholar suggests that Madison had two epistemological goals in
drafting the Ninth Amendment: meta-textual (its very existence reflected the Revolutionary
aspirations of civil liberty and natural rights) and textual (its broad language embraced Revolutionary
principles of personal autonomy). Id. at 454-55, 465-66. One of those textual guarantees is the right
to a private life. Richards, supra note 45, at 844-45; Scott D. Gerber, Privacy and Constitutional
Theory, in THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY 165, 172-73 (Ellen Frankel Paul et al. eds., 2000). Another
commentator believes the Ninth Amendment's unenumerated rights include the broad liberty of self-
governance. Gene R. Nichol, Children of Distant Fathers: Sketching an Ethos of Constitutional
Liberty, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 1305, 1309, 1350 (1985).
94. See, e.g., Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954). While interpreting Fifth Amendment
substantive due process, the Court stated:
Although the Court has not assumed to define "liberty" with any great precision, that term
is not confined to mere freedom from bodily restraint. Liberty under law extends to the full
range of conduct which the individual is free to pursue, and it cannot be restricted except
for a proper government objective.
Id. at 499-500 (applying Fifth Amendment substantive due process analysis to segregation in the
District of Columbia schools).
95. TRIBE, supra note 90, at 336-38; see also Note, Formalism, Legal Realism, and
Constitutionally Protected Privacy Under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, 90 HARV. L. REV. 945,
948-49 (1977).
96. TRIBE, supra note 90, at 1338.
97. During the post-Civil War era, three constitutional amendments-Thirteenth, Fourteenth
and Fifteenth Amendments-were promulgated and ratified, which changed the relationship of the
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Amendment's drafters intended to strengthen congressional powers over
states to create a national framework of civil liberties and to especially protect
the rights of minorities.98 This framework of civil liberties served as the
foundation for greater efforts to attribute substantive meaning to the
Constitution than previously existed in early constitutional jurisprudence.
This foundation was built on the Due Process Clause and the principle that it
protected substantive liberties. 99 Thus, "due process" became more than
procedural; it became the source for protecting substantive rights subsumed
by, but not otherwise enumerated in, "life, liberty, and property."
Modem substantive due process, whether the origins of constitutional
liberty and privacy or not, remains the battlefield for current dispute regarding
Lawrence v. Texas. From its modest and early beginnings in the early Court,
Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process became identified with
Lochner v. New York, 100 which made substantive due process a matter of
regular federal jurisprudence. 101 As applied in Lochner, the doctrine limited
the state's police power to legislate economic relationships with its means-
ends analysis and stood as the bulwark between state micromanagement and
individual autonomy.'0 2 Lochner principles and substantive due process later
fell into disrepute until, at its nadir, the privacy decision in Griswold v.
Connecticut expressly repudiated its underpinnings. 10 3 However, substantive
due process is reviving itself in protecting the individual from abuses of
governmental power in a variety of juridical reviews, not the least of which
affect the analysis of liberty and therefore of privacy. Substantive due
process, under the rubric of liberty, provided the analysis for protecting
privacy in Lawrence v. Texas, serving as it did to allow a broad interpretation
of liberty. It should likewise serve to extend that interpretation of liberty to
protect the privacy of children while they are in school. 10
4
federal government with the state governments. E.g., id. at 920.
98. Id. at 1295; Robert J. Kaczorowski, Revolutionary Constitutionalism in the Era of the Civil
War and Reconstruction, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 863, 874-884 (1986); John E. Nowak, Federalism and
the Civil War Amendments, 23 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 1209, 1211, 1214 (1997).
99. See generally TRIBE, supra note 90, at 1332-33.
100. 198 U.S. 45, 53 (1905).
101. TRIBE, supra note 90, at 1343-45. Some observers attribute substantive due process's
ascendance to conservative, economic forces opposed to government imposition of labor regulations.
Id. at 1345.
102. Id. at 1344-45.
103. 381 U.S. 479, 481-82 (1965); Rubenfeld, supra note 63, at 802.
104. The substantive due process analysis that most directly concerns privacy issues is the
protection of the individual from state action that infringes on traditional freedoms. TRIBE, supra
note 90, at 1362-63.
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II. PRIVACY: THE MOBIUS STRIP
The narrow holding of Lawrence v. Texas recognizes a particular privacy
interest as a constitutional liberty, prohibiting government interference with
certain sexual conduct among a narrow group of individuals.0 5  The more
general postulate underlying that recognition was the Court's expansion of
liberty to cover that privacy interest. To use Lawrence v. Texas as the
theoretical foundation for concluding that children have a similar
constitutionally protected privacy interest, one must generalize Lawrence's
holding to protect privacy per se, a move that the Court has been unwilling to
make. Instead, its constitutional privacy jurisprudence is a patchwork of ad
hoc decisions reacting to specifically litigated government regulations. The
Lawrence Court, however, has come closest to recognizing constitutional
privacy per se. Such constitutional privacy-or liberty-does not need any
particular dimensions. The fewer the dimensions to privacy and autonomy,
the better. Such privacy is derived from liberty, to which our historical
tradition ascribes no particular boundaries. If liberty-in all its vagueness-is
recognized as a constitutional prerogative of longstanding historical tradition,
then so too should privacy. And although such constitutional protection
would be denied by those who argue privacy is not an enumerated right, "[i]f
it would be misleading to incorporate a right of privacy into a legal rule, it
would be impoverishing to exclude it as the term of a legal principle."'
10 6
Consequently, the first step in recognizing educational privacy is to "prove"
constitutional privacy.
As the analytical approach in Lawrence v. Texas suggests, proving that
privacy per se is worthy of constitutional protection must be done through
history, legal traditions, and practices. 10 7 Without that tenet, a privacy interest
for schoolchildren is difficult to establish because schoolchildren are
surrounded by the government where "quantifying" a privacy interest is
important for establishing boundaries over which that government may not
cross. Although ordinarily the plethora of scholarly work would assist here,
the task is somewhat more difficult because children are, for the most part,
simply incapable of formulating the intellectual boundaries so prized by the
philosophical and legal literature. Thus, one must examine something more
deeply rooted in human experience than an artificial legal construct could
105. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003).
106. Paul A. Freund, Privacy: One Concept or Many, in NOMOS XIII: PRIVACY 182, 198 (J.
Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1971).
107. This analytical framework arises from Lawrence v. Texas and not from any particular
historical scholarship surrounding constitutional questions. See generally G. Edward White, The
Arrival of History in Constitutional Scholarship, 88 VA. L. REV. 485 (2002).
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provide.
Lawrence's methodology is well suited to the examination of the history,
practices, and traditions'0 8 of privacy itself because it has "ancient roots" in
Western civilization in general and American culture in particular. History,
practices, and traditions also encompass privacy in its affirmative aspect-as
a quantifiable attribute-and in its liberty aspect, the freedom from
governmental regulation. Here, exploration of privacy must begin with the
actual psychological and physiological "practices" of privacy in which
humans have engaged. 10 9  The second part of the analysis explores the
historical evolution of privacy per se in America, while the third will trace its
legal traditions. This exploration will demonstrate that privacy is a
fundamental human practice arising from the autonomous character of human
nature and that, historically, it has been protected in American legal tradition
because that autonomous character is, and has been, so highly prized in this
country. All three aspects of this substantive liberty interest are inextricably
intertwined in the American psyche, an analytical Mbbius Strip.
A. Practices of Privacy
1. "The Origin of Species"
There is something basically instinctive about privacy. In daily discourse,
humans often will shrink from the touch of another unless there is some
familiarity between them. Some people simply do not like to be touched, by
anybody, while others jealously guard private space from intrusion. A
pregnant woman is offended when some stranger familiarly pats her belly, and
children will fight to get away from a relative who grabs to give them a hug.
108. See generally Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997). Finding historical tradition
that predates the Constitution or the Bill of Rights is often constrained by the absence of similar
democratic and republican institutions like the American experience. Historical tradition is
somewhat easier to find for Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence because of intervening American
history.
109. What exactly is meant by "practices" for proving a constitutional right is not entirely clear
from the authorities. When the Court "examined" the "practices" of physician-assisted suicide in
Washington v. Glucksberg, it never really clarified what evidence proved any particular "practice"
other than current state laws prohibiting such suicide--evidence that seems rather too recent to have
any historical significance in the traditionalist sense that a fundamental right must have its ancient
roots in common law. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 716-719. To confuse matters
further, the requirement that "practices" be proved in Washington v. Glucksberg derived from the
majority decision in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833,
848-49 (1992), which actually abjured the examination of specific practices: "Neither the Bill of
Rights nor the specific practices of States at the time of the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment
mark the outer limits of the substantive sphere of liberty which the Fourteenth Amendment protects."
Id. at 848.
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One has difficulty verbalizing this reflexive reaction, 1 0 but at its very core, it
intimates privacy and has roots so primitive as to be observable in animals.
Territoriality is at the root of this most rudimentary of privacies.
Domestic cats are perhaps the species most identified with this "leave-me-
alone" attitude; one gets along better with cats by letting them approach than
by approaching them. Cats even go so far as to stake out their own "personal"
territory with urine to warn off intruding cats. But this kind of "personal"
territory is not confined to just cats. Most animals tend toward this type of
territoriality.'11 Animals have instinctive needs to avoid the trespass of others,
both as a member of a defined group and as an individual.
A defined group's solitude functions as the regulation of the population to
a certain density in a particular area; as protection of self and the group from
intruders; and as isolation of the group for social sustenance of the group. 
l 2
Such group behavior among animals is a higher order of biological behavior
that stakes out spatial territory in defense of the group against others.
1 3
Human group territoriality similarly stakes out the boundaries of the group,
albeit more for social rather than for biological needs."
14
An animal's individual isolation, however, has one major function:
survival. Animal solitude is instrumental in the survival of the social
organism, of the group, and of the individual.' 15 First, the social organism
benefits because individual solitude allows the individual the social distance
to court, mate, and rear offspring without the aggression and fighting
occasioned by overpopulating a minimal space.1 16 Second, the group benefits
from individual solitude because the absence of individual minimum space
can threaten the survival of the group itself through "biochemical die-off,"
110. Body language is sometimes considered among the nonverbal signs of privacy. IRWIN
ALTMAN, THE ENVIRONMENT AND SOCIAL BEHAVIOR: PRIVACY, PERSONAL SPACE, TERRITORY,
CROWDING 34-36 (Lawrence S. Wrightsman ed., 1975). "[T]here is a vast array of nonverbal
behaviors that are potentially relevant to privacy regulation." Id. at 36.
111. WESTIN, supra note 16, at 8. Territoriality, for purposes of biological studies, is primarily
referred to in terms of "property." ROBERT ARDREY, THE TERRITORIAL IMPERATIVE: A PERSONAL
INQUIRY INTO THE ANIMAL ORIGINS OF PROPERTY AND NATIONS 3 (1966). Like the concept of
privacy, the concept of property is an artificial principle of legal dimensions for which animals have
no abstract cognizance. The nomenclature may be interchangeable with regard to human behavior
because the reasons for human respect for property as well as for privacy are both driven biologically
by matters of survival. Id. at 7.
112. WESTIN, supra note 16, at 9.
113. ALTMAN, supra note 110, at 105-107.
114. Id. at 108.
115. DAVID LEVINSON & MARTIN J. MALONE, TOWARD EXPLAINING HUMAN CULTURE: A
CRITICAL REVIEW OF THE FINDINGS OF WORLDWIDE CROSS-CULTURAL RESEARCH 95 (1980);
WESTIN, supra note 16, at 9-10.
116. WESTIN, supra note 16, at 9.
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when overcrowding creates metabolic stress in the population and kills some
of its members.' 17 Last, individual solitude is important for the survival of the
individual in a manner most closely akin to human privacy, or in the
existential sense, the "cognitive territoriality" that is distinctly human.l1S
Variously called "personal distance," "social distance," "intimate
distance," and "flight distance," measured spaces between individual animals
and their territorial groups serve different purposes. "Personal distance" is far
enough among the members so that individuals in the group can function as
part of the social organism.1 9 "Social distance," on the other hand, is close
enough to link the individuals to a particular group. "Intimate distance"
describes the distance between family members of a particular unit. And
"flight distance" is the space in which an animal will flee an individual from
another species. 20  These levels of individual spacing are those most
analogous with human behavior.
In studies of humans at this most primitive level, individual privacy and
solitude are perceived as evolutionary.12 1 Even with our minimal dependence
on flight distance-we humans measure our flight-or-fight response on a more
abstract level of danger than mere trespass-we humans do have our social
spaces, our intimate spaces, and our personal spaces.' 22 Studies have found
physiological as well as psychological responses to intrusions to those
spaces. 1 3  But the consciousness of those spaces and the abstractions of
individual human privacy are more a function of a society's enculturation
rather than just evolution. 24
117. Id. at 10; ALTMAN, supra note 110, at 169-70.
118. Altman describes this solitude as follows:
Idea or cognitive territoriality... seems to be a distinctly human property. In the
sciences, arts, and many other fields, copyrights, patents, and possession of ideas are of
great importance. In fact, this territoriality applies to most people, who spend
considerable time developing and defending attitudes, opinions, values, and philosophies
that identify them as unique beings.
ALTMAN, supra note 110, at 108-09.
119. WESTIN, supra note 16, at 9. This type of territoriality has also been called "individual
distance" and is most closely identified with a "personal" privacy in animals. ARDREY, supra note
111, at 158-59.
120. WESTIN, supra note 16, at 9.
121. ARDREY, supra note 111, at 7. One biologist believes this territoriality instinct in humans
may have been the root of the species' very survival, as an "unencumbered intelligence." However,
he also acknowledges this trait has diminished as modem man has exerted more and more deliberate
influence over his environment. Id. at 34-35.
122. WESTIN, supra note 16, at 9.
123. ALTMAN, supra note 110, at 86-94.
124. WESTIN, supra note 16, at 10; Alexander Rosenberg, Privacy as a Matter of Taste and
Right, in THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY 68, 73-74 (Ellen Frankel Paul et al. eds., 2000); see also Morton
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2. Coming of Age
Both humans and animals are social creatures. An animal's need for
solitude is for its very survival. Its engaging in social behavior includes not
only propagation of the species but also stimulation. 125 Similarly, humans
engage in social behavior although human social orders tend to be more
complex and sophisticated. This dichotomy between the social and the
solitary-the public and the private-is strongly influenced by cultural
privacy practices.12 6  Thus, cultural mechanisms will influence a society's
privacy customs. 2 7 The more elementary the society, the more rudimentary
its members' privacy customs. At the end of the spectrum where "political"
integration is lowest, the society functions at a more evolutionary level where
group survival is more important than individual privacy. As political
integration of the culture increases, individual privacy increases. 1
28
In an example of a more primitive society that placed little emphasis on
privacy, Margaret Mead's studies of Samoan culture revealed that children
were raised by the village members and were exposed to all aspects of life in
the public arena. 129 There was very little privacy because individuals were not
"trained" to seek it, and there was, in fact, some suspicion of private
behavior. 130 Adults wore little clothing while their children wore none. Their
homes had no walls, and bathing took place in public.' 3' About the only
activity for which privacy was acceptable was an individual's first experience
of sexual intercourse. 1
32
As the roles of society's members become more delineated and complex,
measures of privacy become more delineated. The Mehinacu of central
Brazil-a small, agricultural group in the tropics-has a highly exposed
society: they live in thatched, windowless dwellings on an open plaza; anyone
can hear what is going on in another's dwelling; gossip is rampant; and
everyone knows everyone else's business. 133  However, despite the
H. Levine, Privacy in the Tradition of the Western World, in PRIVACY: A VANISHING VALUE 3
(William C. Bier ed., 1980).
125. WESTIN, supra note 16, at 9-10.
126. One author describes the social-solitude dichotomy of the human animal as the "dialectic
nature of privacy." ALTMAN, supra note 110, at 22.
127. See generally ALTMAN, supra note 110, at 40-42.
128. John M. Roberts & Thomas Gregor, Privacy: A Cultural View, in NOMOS XIII: PRIVACY
199, 200-03 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1971).
129. JOHN J. HONIGMANN, CULTURE & PERSONALITY 15-16 (1954).
130. MARGARET MEAD, COMING OF AGE IN SAMOA: A PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDY OF
PRIMITIVE YOUTH FOR WESTERN CIVILIZATION 219 (1973).
131. Id. at 136; WESTIN, supra note 16, at 12.
132. MEAD, supra note 130, at 132; see also WESTIN, supra note 16, at 12-14.
133. Roberts & Gregor, supra note 128, at 205-07. Unfortunately, the "openness" of the
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permeability of the houses, the Mehinacu who casually intrudes in another's
home is discourteous. 34 Women are threatened with gang rape if they enter
the men's house, the temple cum social club in the center of the settlement.
35
In addition, Mehinacu society has a rudimentary kinship organization within
which are specific roles and relationships requiring respect of "privacy";
codes of affinal avoidance keep sacrosanct portions of the unpartitioned
houses in which reside certain family members. 136 Furthermore, several types
of ceremonial seclusion account for extended periods of actual, physical
isolation for individual members: maternity, first occurrence of fatherhood,
coming-of-age at adolescence, and death of a spouse. 137  Thus, even
"primitive" societies have created cultural notions of privacy-both group and
individual-that go beyond the simple, evolutionary survival of the group and
that, if ignored, lead to punitive measures from the group.
Other rudimentary, ethnographic comparisons reveal that economic
complexity also functions to increase the norms of privacy, particularly for the
smaller household group. Thus, as a society progresses from the hunter-
gatherer stages to more sophisticated levels of economic sustenance, so too
does its household privacy increase. A particular cross-cultural and direct
correlation has been noted between such domestic privacy and a society's
reliance on animal husbandry and agriculture, marriage, and religion. 138 This
correlation has been traced as far back as the Neolithic era, at the dawn of
modern man. 139 Consequently, privacy as a cultural influence has its origins
in both political and economic forces.
The universality of privacy derived from these cultural studies reveals that
each society selects cultural norms for individual, family, and group
privacy. 40  These cultural norms-at least in Western tradition-reflect the
tension between the individuation and the group socialization of the individual
member.'14  Some norms are based on the more primitive spatial-territorial
concepts of privacy surrounding tangible concerns for trespass and property
community does not eliminate social disorder: theft is a daily occurrence; most young Mehinacu are
promiscuous and engage in extramarital conduct; and at least half the adult men are considered
witches. Id. at 207.
134. Id. at 205, 210.
135. Id. at 210.
136. Id. at 210-11.
137. A member can be isolated for up to eight years. Id. at 211-12.
138. Id. at 200-03.
139. Id. at 203, 224-25.
140. WESTIN, supra note 16, at 13; see also Robert F. Murphy, Social Distance and the Veil, in
PHILOSOPHICAL DIMENSIONS OF PRIVACY: AN ANTHOLOGY 34 (Ferdinand David Schoeman ed.,
1984) (describing the maintenance of a social distance created by the Tauregs' use of veils).
141. Levine, supra note 124, at 3-4.
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while others have extended this territoriality to the more sophisticated
recognition of the less tangible attribute of "personal life-space." From these
basic universal attributes of privacy, different societies have effectuated
different privacy norms impelled by their own unique circumstances.1 42 From
that universality, the American culture has adopted norms of privacy that have
been greatly influenced by our unique tradition and geography.
B. Historical Tradition of American Privacy
The historical tradition of American privacy is clearly meshed with this
country's unique cultural practices. From settlement until the mid-1800s,
privacy as an abstraction was understood, although not articulated. By the
mid-1800s, the historical tradition of privacy became more articulated,
especially in the philosophical literature. The historical tradition of privacy
started with the physical space of the American continent then evolved into
the notion of privacy as a "tangible," metaphysical object as it became harder
and harder to find and as technology advanced to the point that space and
territoriality could no longer define privacy. The historical tradition of
American privacy is one bound to our innate sense of self and autonomy,
virtues that we perceive as inherent in our culture and in our history.
1. Where the Deer & the Antelope Play
The origins of American cultural privacy are hazy, although some reliance
on its evolutionary, biological aspects is apparent in the manner by which the
first settlers adapted to the new expansive country. 143 However, evidence
suggests that the nascent cultural mechanism derived from the English
background of the first settlers, who valued both individual and group
solitude. 144 Puritans in particular valued privacy, especially in worship, but
devalued privacy when it affected the interests of the community. 145 Indeed,
early Puritan theories of the distinction between the state and the individual
suggested that the individual should be subservient to the good of the state.
1 46
However, the reality of transporting colonists to a country from which ties to
both governmental and religious authority were severed by distance ultimately
doomed those principles. 1
4 7
142. See, e.g., id. at 6-9.
143. See, e.g., DAVID H. FLAHERTY, PRIVACY IN COLONIAL NEW ENGLAND 6 (1972).
144. Id. at 7.
145. Id. at 15.
146. Darrett B. Rutman, The Mirror of Puritan Authority, in SELECTED ESSAYS: LAW AND
AUTHORITY IN COLONIAL AMERICA 149, 153 (1965).
147. Id. at 155-56; see also STEPHEN BOTEIN, EARLY AMERICAN LAW AND SOCIETY 18-30
(1983). The doom of these Puritan principles was marked particularly in the legal relationship of the
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The new American reality was that society in general, and religion in
particular, did not have the same cohesive influence on settlers more
interested in individual pursuits. 148  And although the "natural corrupt
liberties" that set an individual apart from the teachings of the religious
society were decried by the Puritan authorities, ultimately those liberties
prevailed, especially as the colonists began to resist governance by the
church. 149  As Puritanism declined as a social influence-during the
expansion of settlements throughout the colonies and westward-with it
declined its religious influence over some of its basic tenets of privacy.' 50 On
the other hand, the original English settlers' innate sense of autonomy, and
therefore of privacy, survived, as much a function of Western humanism than
as some evolutionary imperative. 15 1 Indeed, this sense of autonomy became
imperative for the survival of democracy. 1
52
At the time of colonization, privacy as an articulable value was just as
vague as the value ascribed to democracy, liberty, and property. 153 However,
as America became more politically and economically complex, privacy
became a more valued cultural norm. In the early colonial years, the social
human valued interactions with friends outside the family unit and valued the
creation of interdependent neighborhoods. Although these neighborhoods
necessarily thrived at the expense of privacy, the neighborhood could also
express disapproval for an invasion of privacy, thereby balancing the spatial
and social aspects of the individual. 154  Evolving American culture
increasingly valued privacy as both its governmental formalism and its
individual and the state:
Within the general legal environment that English settlers tried to establish in northeastern
America, perhaps the most important ideological source of disharmony was religion. At
the extremes of the colonial Protestant spectrum were strict advocates of the Church of
England as a state religion and radical dissenters espousing pure voluntarism. In most
places at most times, however, the legal issues dividing colonists as they went about
organizing their ecclesiastical affairs were more subtle. What developed eventually was a
troublesome pattern of localistic deviation from English norms. The precarious role of the
Church of England in colonial American was symptomatic of underlying weaknesses in the
structure of transatlantic empire.
Id. at 18.
148. Rutman, supra note 146, at 160-61.
149. Id. at 153-54; BOTErN, supra note 147, at 32.
150. FLAHERTY, supra note 143, at 17.
151. Id. at 6.
152. Democracy's survival depends upon individualism, and privacy is essential to the growth
of that individualism. See, e.g., Bazelon, supra note 2, at 592.
153. FLAHERTY, supra note 143, at 5.
154. Id. at 97.
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economic sophistication increased: The ideal balance for American privacy
arose from "small-scale societies with patrilocal residence, subsistence
through agriculture or animal husbandry, and a strong belief in a high god."'
' 55
In addition, American privacy reflected the increased value the colonists
and succeeding generations placed on autonomy and individualism, spawning
the search for personal privacy as a cultural norm for colonial Americans.
Improvements in economic conditions also provided opportunities for
building homes that would provide more privacy and for movement away
from communities to greater isolation. 156 Greater choice of territories gave
greater options for manipulating one's individual environment, making the
idiosyncrasies of privacy a matter of individual choice rather than of group
survival. The cultural norms for American privacy therefore depended in
large measure on an innate belief in individual autonomy.
Rudimentary judicial recognition of privacy mirrored this individual-
community distinction: "It is certain every man has a right to keep his own
sentiments, if he pleases. He has certainly a right to judge whether he will
make them public, or commit them only to the sight of his friends."'57
However, early privacy regulation in the colonies is a primitive pastiche of
religious-based tenets that abounded in colonial New England. 158 As time
passed, the colonists' innate sense of individualism took over. They became
increasingly resentful of such control, and those regulations became
decreasingly enforced. 59 That individualism also impelled the colonists to
greater certainty that they did not want the government involved in their lives.
Thus, the natural progression to an "individualist" democracy begat the notion
of at least partial autonomy of persons and of institutions. 160 The colonists'
aversion to government regulation and surveillance of their private lives
solidified into a suspicion. Hence, colonial privacy was not viewed as a
quantifiable personal attribute as much as a negative attribute limiting
government interference in their private lives as previously endured under the
Puritans.'61
As the United States matured as a nation, individualism and privacy
155. LEVINSON & MALONE, supra note 115, at 56.
156. Id. at 244-45.
157. Millar v. Taylor, 4 Burr. 2303, 2379 (1769) (quoted in Samuel D. Warren & Louis D.
Brandeis, The Right to Privacy [The implicit made explicit], 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890), in
PHILOSOPHICAL DIMENSIONS OF PRIVACY: AN ANTHOLOGY 75, 92 n.16 (Ferdinand David
Schoeman, ed. 1984)).
158. See generally WESTIN, supra note 16, at 164-184.
159. Id. at 187.
160. Id. at 25-26; see also FLAHERTY, supra note 143, at 243-44.
161. FLAHERTY, supra note 143, at 245-46.
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flourished. Until the 1850s, this spirit was fed primarily by the territorial
limitations on social intercourse-geography and space. Actual solitude and
isolation were abundant for the primarily agrarian American population, who
resided in rural areas with necessarily large spaces between households. This
geographic isolation was even available, albeit to a lesser extent, in the urban
areas. Urban areas still had relatively small populations and plentiful
available space to build homes for individual families, and furthermore to
build those homes with individual rooms for family members. And there still
remained the Western frontier for settlement. 162 Thus, the spaciousness of
America itself and the geographic movement from the east coast to the west
coast contributed to a sense of territoriality-and to a certain extent,
isolationism-both of the group and of the individual that became part of the
American cultural mechanisms influencing unique norms of privacy.
By the latter half of the nineteenth century, the cultural mechanisms
influencing privacy changed somewhat. The American frontier was officially
"dead." Settlements throughout the country became more connected by travel
and communication and there developed an interconnectedness and
dependence belying the rugged individualism of early settlers. Although
people located in rural and sparsely populated areas often had some
geographic distance between them, the growth of industry and urban centers
forced more and more people to live in greater proximity to each other. As
America's population increased dramatically through the twentieth century,
the space decreased even more. As a consequence, privacy based solely on
quantifiable territoriality became a thing of the past in most American
geographical locations.1
63
However, American privacy norms derived from our unique history
remained. These "ancient roots" of privacy are based on the autonomy and
individualism arising from both revolutionary zeal and space. Furthermore,
the freedom associated with such autonomy goes all the way back to our
historical agrarian and Jeffersonian roots.' 64 Such notions of autonomy and
privacy are also unique cultural developments of our identity as America
became a country of immigrants and watched the dissolution of old social
orders. 165 And even if our freedom is more a historical product than an
162. RICHARD F. HIXSON, PRIVACY IN A PUBLIC SOCIETY: HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONFLICT 17-
18 (1987).
163. Id. at 25. Furthermore, the increasing impersonality engendered by technology has a
direct impact on privacy and affects a vital component of an individual's personality. HONIGMANN,
supra note 129, at 356-57.
164. CLYDE KLUCKHOHN, MIRROR FOR MAN: THE RELATION OF ANTHROPOLOGY TO
MODERN LIFE 234 (1949).
165. Identity can be traced to developmental changes, sociocultural impacts, language
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absolute,' 66 our privacy is no less inherent in that freedom and autonomy,
whether defined as a fundamental right or as a constitutional liberty.' 67 And
the practice of honoring that autonomy has "ancient roots."
2. "All men's miseries.. ,,168
By the end of the first 100 years of the republic, the historical tradition of
American privacy became less quantifiable by space and more theoretical by
abstraction. Thus, this stage of the historical tradition of American privacy
reflects deliberate philosophical musings rather than instinctual assumptions
of wide-open spaces and solitude. Congruent with the shrinking of the sense
of territory and space was the increasing American sense of individual privacy
because as a fundamental adjunct to the burgeoning population was not just
the loss of space but the loss of solitude and anonymity. For a while, that loss
of anonymity had a community function because the trade-off was the
supportive nature of the community. However, the spread of newspapers in
the late eighteenth century elevated neighborly gossip into public
information. 69  So as spatial privacy decreased and social interaction
necessarily increased, artificial interstices between individuals and the rest of
the world became necessary to create personal privacy. To a certain extent,
these interstices were for the preservation of "self," a psychological identity
related to autonomy. 70  Contemporary theorists, however, expressed those
constructs, and psychosocial issues. JANE KROGER, IDENTITY DEVELOPMENT: ADOLESCENCE
THROUGH ADULTHOOD 15, 17-23 (2000). However, historical research indicates that identity is also
a social construct that created in colonial Americans a deep-seated conflict between the individual
and the state. Id. at 15-16.
166. CLAUDE LtvI-STRAuss, THE VIEW FROM AFAR 281 (Joachim Neugroschel & Phoebe
Hoss trans., 1984). "By providing freedom with a supposedly rational foundation, one condemns it
to eliminating [its] rich content and to sapping its own strength." Id. at 287.
167. Id. Levi-Strauss succinctly observed:
[T]he rights that freedom is asked to protect have a basis that is in part irrational: they
consist of those minute privileges, those possibly ludicrous inequalities that, without
infringing upon the general equality, allow individuals to find the nearest anchorage. True
liberty is that of long habit, of preferences-in a word, of customs .... Liberty is
maintained from the inside; it undermines itself when people think they can construct it
from without.
Id
168. "All men's miseries derive from not being able to sit quiet in a room alone." Blaise
Pascal.
169. HIXSON, supra note 162, at 23.
170. LEVINSON & MALONE, supra note 115, at 95; Bazelon, supra note 2, at 588. Pioneer
psychiatrists and psychologists-such as Sigmund Freud, Eric Erickson, and Jean Piaget-would
later all depict human development as a move toward a differentiation from others, a separateness as
an individual. ROBERT KEGAN, THE EVOLVING SELF: PROBLEM AND PROCESS IN HUMAN
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principles in terms of philosophy and first formulated negative representations
of privacy, then later formulated it into an affirmative quality.
Privacy as a negative attribute-the absence of interference-took shape
as a distinct philosophical principle by the mid-1800s. The American
transcendentalists encouraged the American "spirit of isolation." The
philosophical reflection of contemporary privacy practices surrounding this
uniquely American autonomy was synthesized by the likes of Ralph Waldo
Emerson and Henry David Thoreau, who encouraged individualism and
personal freedom and emphasized selfhood. 171  These configurations of
privacy were but reflections of Lockean and Jeffersonian political
philosophies that human rights are best described in the negative-that the
rights of citizens should not be violated by the government. 172  And these
configurations fit nicely into the rugged individualism by which Americans
perceived themselves as a culture. 173  But the connection between this
DEVELOPMENT 117 (1982). This differentiation is variously called "ego," "self," and "person" and,
metaphysically, might be considered the human demarcation between an event and the reaction to
that event by the individual. Id. at 2-3. Included in this separateness is one's identity, a tenet that
has as much foundation in psychology as it does in metaphysics. JORGE J.E. GRACIA,
INDIVIDUALITY: AN ESSAY ON THE FOUNDATIONS OF METAPHYSICS 38 (1988). "[A] condition that
is frequently regarded as important for an understanding of individuality is identity" but only as
something less than individuality itself Id. at 38-39. "In one sense... individuation demands that a
person create himself, whereas identification requires only that he finds himself." HENDRIK
MARINUS RUITENBEEK, THE INDIVIDUAL & THE CROWD: A STUDY OF IDENTITY IN AMERICA 41
(1964). Whether psychological, evolutional, or cultural, this separateness, or autonomy, is assumed.
Dorothy Lee, Are Basic Needs Ultimate?, in PERSONALITY IN NATURE, SOCIETY, AND CULTURE
335, 339 (Clyde Kluckhohn & Henry A. Murray eds., 1971). And Americans, in particular, require
this autonomy. Erik H. Erikson, Growth and Crisis of the "Healthy Personality," in PERSONALITY
IN NATURE, SOCIETY, & CULTURE 185, 204 (Clyde Kluckhohn & Henry A. Murray eds., 2d ed.
1971).
171. HIXSON, supra note 162, at 18-20; see generally Bazelon, supra note 2, at 589-591.
172. "'[T]he legitimate powers of government extend to such acts only as are injurious to
others."' Nichol, supra note 93, at 1325 (quoting 1787 letter from Thomas Jefferson to James
Madison); see also GERALD L. GUTEK, HISTORICAL & PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF
EDUCATION: SELECTED READINGS 162-63 (2d ed. 1997); but see Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner's
Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 873, 888-89 (1987) (asserting that, although conventional wisdom is
that the Constitution guarantees the negative quality-the absence of government interference-
rather than affirmative rights, the reality of contouring rights is based on the natural or desirable
functions of government as understood from common law baselines).
173. The literature concerning privacy might well be said to go back to the Bible, that God's
second gift to man after life was "the right to be reticent before the eyes of each other." HIxSON,
supra note 162, at 3. John Milton employed similar biblical references in Paradise Lost. Id. at 3-4.
Other instances of literary "withdrawal," "seclusion," and the metaphysical nature of self exist, id. at
20-23. Contemporary literature continues these themes of individualism, selfhood, isolation, and the
like as various authors and philosophers opine their own versions and visions of privacy. See
generally Ferdinand David Schoeman, Privacy: Philosophical Dimensions of the Literature, in
PHILOSOPHICAL DIMENSIONS OF PRIVACY: AN ANTHOLOGY 1, 12-13 (Ferdinand David Schoeman
ed., 1984); GEORGE ORWELL, 1984 (Signet Book 1990); see also FRANZ KAFKA, METAMORPHOSIS
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philosophy and a philosophy of affirmative privacy was not really made until
the end of the nineteenth century.
One of the most influential pieces of the philosophical privacy literature
was the work of Robert Warren and Louis Brandeis in their 1890 Harvard
Law Review article, The Right to Privacy.174 This seminal piece set out the
rudiments of privacy as a positive, nearly quantifiable, concept for limiting
the intrusion of technology, especially the press. 175 In the absence of legal
redress under the current common law, Warren employed his friend Brandeis
to create a legal philosophy of privacy defined no more particularly than the
right to be let alone. 176 The crux of this privacy right was the creation of
"bounds of propriety and of decency"' 77 over which the press could not cross.
Warren and Brandeis specifically acknowledged that their proposition was a
function of the loss of territoriality and the increasing interdependence of
humans: "The intensity and complexity of life, attendant upon advancing
civilization, have rendered necessary some retreat from the world, and man,
under the refining influence of culture, has become more sensitive to
publicity, so that solitude and privacy have become more essential to the
individual."'
178
Although the authors placed this right in the context of their abhorrence of
gossip, the press, and the increasingly "sophisticated" means of invading
privacy, they also recognized that what they were asking the law to do was
recognize an incorporeal right-that what they were asking the law to do was
recognize the "thoughts, emotions, and sensations" inevitably arising from an
"intense intellectual and emotional life.' ' 179 And the article has significantly
influenced both privacy philosophy and the American legal tradition. 180 As
(Bantam Classics 1972) (isolation as symbolic of Germany's post-World War I anomie).
174. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy [The implicit made
explicit], 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890) in PHILOSOPHICAL DIMENSIONS OF PRIVACY: AN
ANTHOLOGY 75 (Ferdinand David Schoeman, ed. 1984).
175. Although the stories explaining Warren's crusade for privacy are apocryphal, the matter
was still personal for Warren. The traditional story is that Warren was upset when the press
published pictures of his daughter's society wedding without permission. Apparently, his daughter
was only six years old when the article was published. Warren, nonetheless, was upset with the press
when he determined on writing his piece with Brandeis. Gormley, supra note 2, at 1349.
176. See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 174, at 75.
177. Id. at 76.
178. Id. at 77.
179. Id. at 76.
180. See, e.g., Richard C. Turkington, Legacy of the Warren and Brandeis Article: The
Emerging Unencumbered Constitutional Right to Informational Privacy, 10 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 479,
481 (1990). There did exist some civil law governing privacy before the Warren and Brandeis
article. See generally Note, The Right to Privacy in Nineteenth Century America, 94 HARV. L. REV.
1892 (1981). The roots of informational privacy are in early American regard for the sanctity of the
2004]
MARQUETTE LA W REVIEW
the legal decisions percolated through the courts-testing, rejecting, and
adopting Warren and Brandeis's theorem-the historical tradition of privacy
as philosophy was fairly quiescent until the mid-twentieth century.
Privacy as philosophy and personal concern assumed urgency after World
War II. During the ensuing Cold War era, privacy philosophy ratcheted up
the rhetoric and the focus, symptomatic of which was pop sociologist Vance
Packard's The Naked Society in 1964. Privacy could no longer be taken for
granted; privacy had to be protected, even sought out. Both the search for a
philosophy and the search for privacy itself became angst-ridden. Multiple
reasons are proffered for such angst, but two in particular are worthy of
note.18 1 First, there were simply more people in America and thus less actual
space between them. Overcrowding in the urban areas was becoming acute.
No longer were people living in individual houses in which they could seclude
themselves; many were living on top of each other in apartment buildings
several stories high. 182 This cultural-and even psychological-phenomenon
creates anxiety as one feels less autonomous. 183  Indeed, this societal
crowding can even lead to a feeling of social saturation and the psychological
disorder of "multiphrenia," a feeling that one's individuality is having to share
space with too many persons and experiences 184-perhaps the human
equivalent of the animal world's "biochemical die-off." Thus, privacy
philosophy became the outlet for objectifying a cultural norm in the highly
complex American culture as Americans believed their spatial and
psychological autonomies were waning.
The second impetus for privacy philosophy at this time was the era itself
and the perceived government assault on Americans' autonomy. During the
mail and for personal privacy of letters and other confidential information. Id. at 1899. Similarly,
protecting the disclosure of personal information by the government was standard in the nineteenth
century: the government could not disclose information gleaned from the decennial census. Id. at
1904-05.
181. VANCE PACKARD, THE NAKED SOCIETY (1964). Packard did not so much analyze
privacy itself as identify five major forces invading privacy. The first force was the increased
organizational living of Americans that increased our inherent nosiness about fellow citizens. Id. at
16. The second force was driven by Cold War fears-but resonates today in the wake of September
11, 2001-and marked the increase in Americans' "Garrison State Mentality," the state of feeling and
being watched. Id. at 19-20. The third force was the impact of trading data to increase wealth. Id.
at 22-23. The fourth and fifth are related: the growth of the investigation industry, id. at 24, and the
consequent creation of surveillance technology, id. at 29.
182. WESTIN, supra note 16, at 21.
183. Erikson, supra note 170, at 203-04. The "superhuman organizations" in which adults find
themselves can lead to "deep chronic disappointment." Id. at 204. Such feelings explain the
increasing and current concerns about who and what has and is controlling our personal information.
184. KENNETH J. GERGEN, THE SATURATED SELF: DILEMMAS OF IDENTITY IN
CONTEMPORARY LIFE 49, 71, 73 (1991).
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Cold War, Americans found themselves aligned against totalitarian
governments, and they feared those governments' regulation of citizens as
much as their possession of the "bomb." Fueled by George Orwell's 1984
and Ray Bradbury's Fahrenheit 451, the ordinary American citizen feared the
control and surveillance exercised by those governments over their citizens.
Then it dawned on Americans that, if other governments had the means to
control their populations by surveillance and regulation, so too must the
American government.'1 85 And of course the computerization of society and
the collection of data-both privately and by the government-challenged
Americans' egocentric views of autonomy, especially privacy. 186 These were
anathema to Americans.
Literature on the subject began to proliferate-especially in legal circles-
as a means to address and control that perceived interference. Beginning in
the 1960s and 1970s, several influential books and articles on privacy were
published with varying philosophies to define what privacy is, what its
dimensions should be, and the like. The majority of that literature is legal
philosophy, trying to encapsulate privacy into neat little formulwe187 and trying
to create positive-albeit abstract-attributes for privacy. For instance, Alan
Westin's seminal work, Privacy and Freedom, focuses on individual privacy
as "personal autonomy, emotional release, self-evaluation, and limited and
protected communication."' 88  One theme recurs and is tied to a single
conceptualization of a state of human existence. This conceptualization has
had several labels-personhood, 189  autonomy, 19°  identity, 191  personal
185. Similarly to Vance Packard, David Bazelon has argued that privacy requires increased
legal protection because of the following forces: (1) the development of increasingly sophisticated
surveillance technology; (2) the growth of technology to store, share, and manipulate data; (3) the
appetites-of business, government, academia-for information; and (4) the urge to more tightly
regulate an increasingly crowded populace. Bazelon, supra note 2, at 597-600.
186. See, e.g., JOHN CURTIS RAINES, ATTACK ON PRIVACY 17-21 (1974).
187. In 1984, Ferdinand Schoeman categorized much of the extant philosophical literature into
three characterizations of privacy: (1) "a claim, entitlement, or right"; (2) the individual's control
over personal information and access; and (3) a "state or condition of limited access to a person."
Schoeman, supra note 173, at 2-3 (emphasis in original).
188. WESTIN, supra note 16, at 32. On the other hand, there exist arguments skeptical of the
value of privacy and therefore dismiss the necessity for giving it any attributes. See generally
Schoeman, supra note 173, at 8-9.
189. See, e.g., Francis S. Chlapowski, Note, The Constitutional Protection of Informational
Privacy, 71 B.U. L. REV. 133, 150-51 (1991).
190. E.g., Joel Feinberg, Autonomy, Sovereignty & Privacy: Moral Ideals in the Constitution?,
58 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 445, 447-48, 451 (1983) (personal "sovereign authority" is one of several
"senses of autonomy" by which one governs one's self within a personal moral domain); Tom
Gerety, Redefining Privacy, 12 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 233, 236 (1977). "Privacy is ... control
over or the autonomy of the intimacies of personal identity." Id. at 281.
191. See, e.g., Jonathan Kahn, Privacy as a Legal Principle of Identity Maintenance, 33 SETON
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integrity, 192 dignity,' 93 individuality, 194 individuation' 95-but can be reduced
to a psychological state of self in which the individual needs to be free from
intrusion by others. Thus, philosophy extended the American historical
tradition of privacy by putting into words that which the passage of time had
taken away, the historical American assumptions of and demand for space and
autonomy. Consequently, the contemporary condition of American privacy
is, in many respects, the psychological vestige of our culture that perhaps has
more kinship to evolutionary privacy than it has to a cultural norm fed by
space and political autonomy.
C. The Legal Tradition ofAmerican Privacy
The Escher-like quality of the meaning of privacy is most noticeable in
the American legal tradition. The legal tradition of privacy arose from the
early assumptions of American individualism and autonomy. The legal
tradition also recognizes that privacy is the means for perpetuating that
.individualism and autonomy. The connection between the two is indissoluble.
1. "A small hard core of common agreement"'
' 96
Tracing the legal tradition of privacy to support a constitutional liberty
interest for schoolchildren requires an examination of the tradition for both
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments as both the federal and state
governments regulate education these days. Although legal philosophy has
informed much of the historical abstractions of privacy-both Victorian and
contemporary-its focus has tended more toward common law, in the vein of
Warren and Brandeis's article. The impact of that philosophy on privacy as a
cultural, psychological, and legal practice cannot be underestimated.
However, any overview of the legal tradition of constitutional privacy in
HALL L. REV. 371 (2003); see generally ERVING GOFFMAN, STIGMA: NOTES ON THE MANAGEMENT
OF SPOILED IDENTITY 41-104 (1986).
192. Charles Fried, Privacy [A Moral Analysis], in PHILOSOPHICAL DIMENSIONS OF PRIVACY:
AN ANTHOLOGY 203, 206-10 (Ferdinand David Schoeman ed., 1984) (respect, trust, friendship, and
love are impossible without privacy).
193. See Kahn, supra note 191, at 381-84.
194. See, e.g., Bazelon, supra note 2, at 589-91. Similar to Westin's taxonomy of privacy,
Bazelon observes four functions of individual privacy: (1) protecting one's public image; (2)
nurturing individuality itself; (3) permitting emotional release; and (4) promoting human
relationships. Id. at 589-90.
195. Privacy as an existential concept-apart from the legal concept-has been defined as
"both a necessary and a contingent condition of individuals' life experiences and engagements."
O'BRIEN, supra note 2, at 17. This condition limits access to those experiences and engagements
and has both intrinsic and extrinsic value. Id.
196. "Democracy is a small hard core of common agreement, surrounded by a rich variety of
individual differences." James Conant.
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America must diverge somewhat and begin with the origins of the American
republic.
Those origins arose from the colonists' opportunity to break from the
conservative tradition of fealty to a king, as well as their opportunity to
experiment with a republican government. 97  The conjunction of both
opportunities was their desire for liberty. In defining those opportunities, the
Founders were moved and empowered by the works of Montesquieu,
198
Bacon, and Locke.' 99 However, they also worked without many historical
antecedents.2 °° In essence, the drafting of the Constitution created its own
beginning, a new legal tradition of an enduring document that would preserve
the "[b]lessings of [l]iberty to ourselves and our [p]osterity. '20 1 The thrust of
that document, based on its few historical antecedents, was the preservation of
individual rights, an unambiguous acknowledgement of individual autonomy
and, as an adjunct to that autonomy, an unspoken nod to individual privacy.
Pre-revolutionary legal concerns about privacy arose from events in Great
Britain more than they did from events in the colonies. 202  Indeed,
constitutional rights adopted by the colonies were actually the assertion of the
rights of Englishmen they feared losing.20 3 However, in the tradition of
revolution, the colonists also asserted additional rights unique to their own
status and situation: the "right to consent to taxation, the right to
representation, the right to resist unconstitutional government, and the right to
liberty. ''2°4  These latter rights--especially liberty-obviously reflected
unique concerns that arose from the growing tension created by England's
197. Richards, supra note 45, at 814-15.
198. See, e.g., Lynn D. Wardle, The Use and Abuse of Rights Rhetoric: The Constitutional
Rights of Children, 27 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 321, 343-44 (1996). Montesquieu viewed political liberty,
as opposed to independence, to "consist only in the power of doing what we ought to will, and in not
being constrained to do what we ought not to will." M. DE. SECONDAT, BARON DE MONTESQUIEU,
THE SPIRIT OF LAWS 200 (David Wallace Carrithers ed., 1977). Jeremy Bentham similarly
postulated that liberty is a negative concept because "its presence is always marked by the absence of
something, and specifically by the absence of some measure of restraint or constraint." SKINNER,
supra note 67, at 83.
199. Richards, supra note 45, at 815.
200. Id.
201. U.S. CONST. preamble; Richards, supra note 45, at 821. "The American opportunity...
was to create a system of government that would be the result of freedom, theoretical clarity, and the
exercise of collective deliberative choice. The Founders thus used the best critical historiography of
the age and interpreted history in a way that advanced imaginative institutional innovations .... Id.
at 818. An integral part of that deliberative choice was their understanding that the enduring
constitution would be subject to interpretive changes; indeed, its whole purpose was to embrace the
future. Id. at 822.
202. REID, supra note 73, at 193-95.
203. Id. at 4-5.
204. Id. at 16-17.
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rule over an increasingly recalcitrant colonial "union." From that tension
grew a uniquely American legal tradition as revolutionary notions of liberty
expanded both legal protection for the colonists' group and individual
autonomy from English authoritarianism. However, the rights of Englishmen
sowed the seeds of privacy in constitutional legal tradition.
English rights were considered timeless; they were not invented by a
particular legal controversy but were assumed to have existed as an attribute
of government noninterference. Those rights needed no articulation unless
the government went too far.20 5 One of the English rights at the center of that
assumption was the right to liberty, characterized chiefly by the right to
property free from government interference: "For the citizen to be secure in
individual rights, property also had to be secure. 20 6 As a consequence, pre-
constitutional legal tradition regarded as sacred the triumvirate of private
property, personal liberty, and personal security.20 7  Thus, specific "rights"
that were eventually incorporated into the Constitution-in life, liberty and
property-had "ancient roots" in English law, influenced in no small part by
privacy issues.20 8 As the colonists engrafted their own rights of Englishmen
into their political and legal history, they were particularly moved by
immediate privacy concerns.
Particularly worrisome to the colonists were the quartering of soldiers in
private homes and the issuance of general warrants. In reality, the American
colonies were in little jeopardy from these particular grievances because they
were virtually unenforceable in the colonies. 20 9 However, colonial concerns
still had an impact on their political and legal standing with England. In the
first instance, Parliament passed two quartering laws that concerned the
Americans. Those laws prohibited billeting of British soldiers in private
homes but authorized their billeting in private businesses. 210 Although these
laws were not actually enforced effectively, they horrified the colonists by
their mere passage. 211 However, the Americans were more concerned about
the issuance of search warrants even though they were procedurally
inapplicable to the colonial administration. The legal concern was that the
205. Id. at 24-26.
206. Id. at 37.
207. Id. at 36.
208. The Anglo-American approach to privacy seems to differ significantly from that of
continental Europe where one's dignity, more than one's liberty, defines privacy issues. James Q.
Whitman, The Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity Versus Liberty, 113 YALE L.J. 1151, 1161
(2004).
209. REID, supra note 73, at 194-95.
210. Id at 194.
211. Id.
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English executive authority could issue general warrants without judicial
supervision.' 1
Those warrants became a cause c4lbre in England after the King's
ministers ransacked the homes of pamphleteers in order to prosecute sedition
charges.2 13 When in 1765, the pamphleteers sued the government over these
warrants, the English court pronounced them illegal. In Entick v.
Carrington,2 14 Chief Justice Camden reasoned that privacy in one's property
is presumed. In the absence of specific legal authority for the government to
intrude, its use of these warrants was a trespass against an individual's
personal property and therefore void.2 15 The Chief Justice particularly warned
that such warrants, if not restrained, could be used indiscriminately to subject
citizens to a search of their "secret cabinets and bureaus" at the whim of the
secretary of state . 6 The Chief Justice elaborated on this principle in Leach v.
Money, when he stated, "' [O]ur law holds property so sacred, that no man can
set his foot on his neighbor's close without his leave. ' ' '2 17  Thus, the
Englishman's right to privacy was the primary motivation for ruling in favor
of the pamphleteers.21 t
More immediately worrisome to the colonists, and the other principle
controversy that affected colonial privacy jurisprudence, was the Writs of
Assistance Case. 21 9 This case was basically an American matter but derived
from English statutes that granted virtually unfettered authority for customs
officials to enforce rules proscribing trade outside English "channels. ' 220 A
writ of assistance under these statutes compelled others-usually local
officials-to aid customs officials in their searches for and seizures of goods
212. Id.
213. Stuntz, supra note 87, at 397.
214. 19 How. St. Tr. 1029 (1765).
215. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 629 (1886). The Boyd Court actually elevated
Entick v. Carrington to constitutional stature:
As every American statesmen, during our revolutionary and formative period as a nation,
was undoubtedly familiar with this monument of English freedom, and considered it as the
true and ultimate expression of constitutional law, it may be confidently asserted that its
propositions were in the minds of those who framed the Fourth Amendment to the
Constitution, and were considered as sufficiently explanatory of what was meant by
unreasonable searches and seizures.
Id. at 626-27.
216. REID, supra note 73, at 195.
217. ld.
218. Stuntz, supra note 87, at 399-400.
219. Id. at 404.
220. Id. at 404-05; see generally M.H. SMITH, THE WRITS OF ASSISTANCE CASE (1978).
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imported in violation of the rules. 221 When several Boston merchants sought
to void writs served upon them, James Otis represented them, attacking the
writs on both statutory and substantive grounds.222 In a losing cause, Otis
famously argued:
Now one of the most essential branches of English liberty, is the
freedom of one's house. A man's house is his castle; and while he is
quiet, he is as well guarded as a prince in his castle. This writ, if it
should be declared legal, would totally annihilate this privilege.
Custom house officers may enter our houses when they please-we
are commanded to permit their entry-their menial servants may
enter-may break locks, bars and every thing in their way-and
whether they break through malice or revenge, no man, no court can
inquire-bare suspicion without oath is sufficient.223
Thus, the writs of assistance, too, were decried on purely privacy grounds.
And that privacy was based on a substantive elucidation of liberty, that the
writ was "'the worst instrument of arbitrary power, the most destructive of
English liberty, and the fundamental principles of law, that ever was found in
an English law book.' ' 224 The significance of these legal controversies was
not lost on Americans, who believed in Englishmen's right of liberty and
sanctity of the home.225
Preconstitutional legal tradition therefore recognized the meaning of
English liberty and the need to protect it from the arbitrary use of government
power.226 For the colonists, this governmental intrusion on privacy marked a
progressive creep toward totalitarianism, 227 and their archetype of liberty
necessarily had to embrace the protection of privacy as an integral part of
American autonomy. Thus, the precedence of privacy and autonomy over the
authority of the state predates the Constitution. 2 8
221. Stuntz, supra note 87, at 405.
222. Id. at 406.
223. SMITH, supra note 220, at 344; Stuntz, supra note 87, at 406.
224. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 625 (1886) (citations omitted).
225. Thomas V. Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment, 98 MICH. L. REV. 547,
562-65 (1999).
226. Boyd, 116 U.S. at 625. Contemporaneously, William Blackstone theorized that, while
philosophers could not agree on natural rights, there existed three basic principles of law: '"the right
of personal security, the fight of personal liberty, and right of private property."' John Marquez
Lundin, The Law of Equality Before Equality Was Law, 49 SYRACUSE L. REv. 1137, 1180 (1999)
(quoting I WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 70 (1765)).
227. Rubenfeld, supra note 63, at 784; Mark John Kappelhoff, Note, Bowers v. Hardwick: Is
There a Right to Privacy?, 37 AM. U. L. REv. 487,490 (1988).
228. TRIBE, supra note 90, at 1335-36.
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2. A Man's House Is His Castle: Fourth and Fifth Amendments
The legal tradition became concrete with the drafting of the Constitution
and the later Bill of Rights. The Founders believed that rights are retained in
the people and that, after the perceived intrusions of the English sovereignty,
the better government is a limited government. Therefore, the constitutional
legal tradition-based in no small measure on Enlightenment philosophy-
presumed rights independent of the constitutional document and placed limits
on the government. The Constitution was not perceived as granting particular
rights; rather, the rights were assumed, and the government had the burden of
proving why it could infringe upon those rights. Consequently, the legal
tradition of the Constitution was, in most respects, substantive, presuming
those timeless English rights and requiring the government to carry the burden
of proving its capacity to regulate.229 In this regard, several Amendments are
considered to have substantive privacy protections: "[E]very governmental
action interferes with personal privacy to some degree. The question in each
case is whether that interference violates a command of the United States
Constitution., 230 For instance, the First Amendment protects the privacy of
one's associations and beliefs whereas the Third Amendment protects private
homes from nonconsensual quartering of soldiers.23' In each of these
Amendments is the premise that privacy is an assumption of the republic in
which the government may not interfere. Two Amendments in particular
were ratified to protect citizens' privacy and autonomy.
The Fourth Amendment is the most obvious constitutional result of the
colonial legal tradition to protect the Englishmen's timeless right of privacy,
protecting as it does the "right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.',
2 32
With this language, the Founders provided a rudimentary framework of
privacy with particular corporeal markers-persons, houses, papers, and
effects-and emphasized the right to be free from a certain invasion of those
markers by extending the spatial-territorial boundaries between the individual
and the state. This language memorializes a substantive right2 33 and
effectively protects a certain type of privacy.2 34
229. Louis Henkin, Privacy andAutonomy, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 1410, 1412-14 (1974).
230. Katz v. U.S., 389 U.S. 347, 350 n.5 (1967).
231. Id.
232. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 626-27 (1886); The
Right to Privacy in Nineteenth Century America, supra note 180, at 1896. These protections also
became integral parts of state constitutions. Id. at 1897.
233. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Dana, 43 Mass. (2 Met.) 329, 335-36 (1841).
234. Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1, 66-67 (1849) ("The genius of our liberties holds in
abhorrence all irregular inroads upon the dwelling-houses and persons of the citizen, and with a wise
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The colonial legal tradition also infused substantive meaning into the Fifth
Amendment as a guardian of autonomy, and thus, privacy. The Due Process
Clause states that "[n]o person shall be ... deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law." 235 These words expressed a belief in
retained rights that limited the government's power, thereby assuming
substantive meaning not otherwise explicated in this statement. In fact, the
Framers' understanding of "due process of law" was its legal equivalence to
"law of the land," subsuming both procedural and substantive content.
236
In 1886, that legal tradition was especially memorialized in Boyd v.
237United States, a case that relied on legal tradition and substantively linked
the Fourth and Fifth Amendments to privacy and liberty. The controversy at
the heart of the case was a federal customs revenue statute authorizing a court,
on motion from a federal prosecutor, to order the turnover of private books,
papers, and invoices for use in evidence against criminal defendants. 238 The
Boyd court relied on and extended Entick v. Carrington to determine that both
the Fourth and Fifth Amendments were implicated in the case before it
because of their similar protections of liberty and privacy:
The principles laid down in [Entick v. Carrington] affect the very
essence of constitutional liberty and security. They reach farther than
the concrete form of the case then before the court ... ; they apply to
all invasions on the part of the government and its [employees] of the
sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life. It is not the
breaking of his doors, and the rummaging of his drawers, that
constitutes [sic] the essence of the offence; but it is the invasion of his
indefeasible right of personal security, personal liberty and private
property... it is the invasion of this sacred right which underlies and
constitutes the essence of Lord Camden's judgment. 9
jealousy regards them as sacred, except when assailed in the established and allowed forms of
municipal law.") (Woodbury, J., dissenting).
235. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
236. Riggs, supra note 90, at 999-1005; see also TRIBE, supra note 90, at 1332-1334.
237. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
238. Id. at 620.
239. Id. at 630; see generally The Right to Privacy in Nineteenth Century America, supra note
180, at 1897-98. Boyd v. United States has been circumscribed in modem times. E.g., Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350-51 (1967); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 301 (1967).
However, its vitality as a principle of Fifth Amendment liberty was among the precedents on which
Justice Douglas relied in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 n.* (1965). Furthermore, the
1886 vintage of Boyd undermines any suggestion that constitutional privacy is new and novel, an
outgrowth of post-Fourteenth Amendment common law developments that post-date Warren and
Brandeis's 1890 article. See, e.g., MCWHIRTER & BIBLE, supra note 16, at 75; but see Sunstein,
supra note 172, at 885 ("For the most part, liberty and property are defined by reference to the
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Thus, legal tradition in Supreme Court jurisprudence early ascribed privacy
protection to the Fourth and the Fifth Amendments.
Similar concerns over privacy in the context of searches and seizure were
detailed by early state court cases. In a case where illegally imported goods
were seized from a stagecoach pursuant to customs statutes but without a
warrant, an 1818 New Hampshire court interpreted the statute's warrant
requirement to protect only those places to which individuals "ha[d] th[e]
exclusive right of possession and privacy."240  Relying on the Fourth
Amendment as authority, an early Louisiana court awarded damages to a
homeowner for an illegal search-the searched premises were contiguous to
but apart from the premises actually described in the warrant. 241 In ruling for
the homeowner, the court determined that the Fourth Amendment was a
"principle so indispensable to the full enjoyment of personal security and
private property, [it] should be enforced in its full spirit and integrity. 242
Thus, the early American legal tradition of privacy-at least in case law-was
the application of the Fourth Amendment, and perhaps the Fifth, to protect
private property from searches and seizures. This right to be free from
unreasonable searches and seizures was easily "quantifiable" because it relied
on territoriality and property demarcations of privacy. And, until 1967, the
Supreme Court relied on that trespass theory of intrusion with regard to
searches and seizures.
Current privacy tradition under the Fourth Amendment was most affected
by the 1967 decision of Katz v. United States,243 in which the Court
determined that privacy under the Fourth Amendment implicitly assumes that
more than tangible items and physical trespass are at stake.244 In Katz, the
government had attached surveillance devices to the outside of a public
telephone booth and intercepted the defendant's transmission of wagers over
common law."). Instead, the Boyd Court clearly linked privacy and liberty under the Bill of Rights to
common law dating all the way back to the 1700s. See generally Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S.
616 (1886). That the Warren and Brandeis article is often used as the starting point for privacy is
more a function of a different "zone" of privacy in civil matters-a "zone" that was born of the
increasing sophistication of surveillance technology and the growth of the press as the purveyor of
"private" information in the late 1800s rather than of constitutional concerns.
240. Jones v. Gibson, 1 N.H. 266 (1818) (emphasis added). Those places worthy of privacy
protection, and thereby meriting a warrant, included a dwelling, store, ship, and vessel. Id.
241. Larthet v. Forgay, 2 La. Ann. 524 (1847).
242. Id. (emphasis added).
243. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
244. See also Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 37 (2001) (explaining that the Fourth
Amendment has never been tied to dividing privacy interests to only private activities in private areas
and that the interior of a home is particularly sacrosanct, especially from warrantless thermal-
imaging).
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the telephone. 245 The Court characterized that interception as a search and
seizure under the Fourth Amendment because it violated the privacy upon
which the defendant justifiably relied when he entered the booth.246 Although
the government agents carefully circumscribed the reach of the surveillance,
their failure to get a warrant made the search unreasonable.247 In reaching this
conclusion, the Court relied not on a territorial protection from trespass but on
a more metaphysical, spatial protection of the person.248 Justice Harlan, in his
concurrence, deemed this a "reasonable expectation of privacy" and asserted
that one's presence in a phone booth is an "expectation[ ] of freedom from
intrusion., 249 As a result, the Fourth Amendment was extended beyond mere
spatial bounds to protect bodily privacy from government scrutiny. 250 The
majority opinion does not fully define privacy in terms other than the
defendant's justifiable reliance that what he said would not be a matter for
public interception and disclosure. But Katz diverted from the Victorian legal
tradition of measuring privacy by quantifiable metes and bounds to something
that more closely resembled the substantive, constitutional liberty interest
intended by the Founders. This more incorporeal privacy interest would come
to full flower under jurisprudence of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
3. OcKham's Razor
251
The legal tradition of privacy owes the greatest debt to twentieth-century
jurisprudence under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
substantive jurisprudence that places the onus on the government rather than
245. Katz, 389 U.S. at 348.
246. Id. at 353.
247. Id. at 358-59.
248. Id. at 351-52.
249. Id. at 360, 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). Commentators have criticized the tautology and
circularity of that "expectations" language as a definition of privacy. See, e.g., Solveig Singleton,
Privacy Versus the First Amendment: A Skeptical Approach, 11 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA &
ENT. L.J. 97, 101-02 (2000); Shaun B. Spencer, Reasonable Expectations and the Erosion of
Privacy, 39 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 843, 846, 860 (2002) ("[The] expectation-driven conception of
privacy is vulnerable to encroachment. Actors and groups powerful enough to influence social
behavior can change society's expectation of privacy, and thereby change what the law will protect
as private."). However, such analyses seem to miss the point that individual privacy was never really
defined by the majority opinion of the Court; only the negative attribute of the government
interference was.
250. Justice Stewart even cited to the Fifth Amendment as part of his rationale for expanding
the privacy protections under the Fourth. 389 U.S. at 350 n.5 (quoting Tehan v. United States ex rel.
Shott, 382 U.S. 406, 416 (1966)).
251. Ironically, William of OcKham is attributed with the first philosophical configuration of
liberty as a subjective state of being. BRETr, supra note 67, at 4-5.
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the individual to define not the limits of privacy but the justification for an
intrusion. The results have been inconsistent, in no small measure because the
focus is usually on the intrusion, not on an overarching liberty. Lawrence v.
Texas comes closest to affording blanket recognition for a constitutional
privacy congruent with individual autonomy, but the legal tradition is a little
messier.
To a certain degree, the difficulty in courts' recognizing a constitutional
privacy per se has been caused by the contemporary common law's framing a
positive, tangible attribute of privacy for purposes of assessing damages. In
disputes between private individuals, the concerns of limited government do
not come into play. Rather, the common law governs duties and
responsibilities between private individuals. Thus, efforts to quantify privacy
as a protectible interest required the creation of a more tangible human
attribute, nearly a property interest, upon which another was not allowed to
trespass. Whether the distinction between a "measurable" privacy interest and
an immeasurable constitutional privacy as autonomy really matters in a
practical sense, this rights-liberty dichotomy has influenced the modem legal
tradition, especially under the Fourteenth Amendment.
Early cases that predated the Fourteenth Amendment tended more toward
the pragmatic, territorial characteristics of privacy. As early as 1826, trespass
was a matter of privacy and the driving consideration in a dispute arising over
a landlord's entry into a household in order to search for property reputedly
stored there by someone other than the tenant.252 Even though the landlord
had the assistance of a constable, the court determined that without the proper
warrant such a "discretionary" visit was a violation of the sanctity of the home
and thereby echoed James Otis's aphorism that "a man's house is his
castle. 253 Such trespass was a violation of "the right of domestic privacy and
security of habitation, which the laws have always manifested a scrupulous
anxiety to protect., 254 Other early courts determined that such trespass should
be compensated by damages for "invasion of ... privacy 255 because "[t]he
very breaking in upon the [plaintiff]'s privacy was a damage. 256 One unusual
1852 case presaged Katz, in which a court was asked to enforce an Alabama
statute that prohibited the playing of cards in a public place. 257 In determining
that a thick grove of woods--out of sight of the nearest store and road-was
252. Hobbs v. Geiss, 13 Serg. & Rawle 417 (Pa. 1826).
253. Id.
254. Ward v. Bartlett, 1 N.H. 14 (1816).
255. Shepard v. Milwaukee Gas Light Co., 15 Wis. 318 (1862).
256. Williams v. Esling, 4 Pa. 486 (1846).
257. Bythwood v. State, 20 Ala. 47 (1852).
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not a public place, the appellate court reversed the convictions and stated:
These persons went to that hollow evidently to be out of the way of
observation, to be, in fact, concealed from the public view, and it is
not reasonable to hold that their being there made that retired and
secluded spot a public place, merely because they went to play cards,
when, as has been shown, the evil intended to be averted was not the
card playing itself, but the effect of the example upon others.
2 58
In early American legal tradition, not only was real property considered
sacrosanct, so was personal property. In 1811, a territorial court rendered a
decision on the publication of private letters in Denis v. LeClerc.259 In that
case, the plaintiff sought to enjoin the defendant from publishing a letter that
the defendant had obtained by improper means.2 60 The letter was written to "a
lady to whom the plaintiff was paying his addresses" and was considered of
sufficient "'mystery and confidence"' that even the court "could not with
propriety read the copy.' 26 1  The court granted the injunction.2 62  The
defendant then attempted to get around the injunction by attaching the letter to
his answer to the plaintiffs complaint.263 The publication was intended solely
to "vex" the plaintiff.264 In ultimately holding the defendant in contempt for
violating the injunction, the court engaged in a lengthy expostulation of
history-going back to Cicero and proceeding through constitutional
protections over copyrighted materials-and inveighed against the insult to
26privacy such publication would constitute. 65 The court ultimately determined
the letter was an object of property that remained in joint possession of the
plaintiff and therefore could not be made public without his permission.266
The court specifically reasoned that "the communication of information,
disadvantageous to a third person and affecting his reputation, is not
considered as illegal when made fairly and confidentially; it is however,
otherwise when made for the sole purpose of working an injury., 267 Thus,
American civil common law early recognized the value of privacy and the
258. Id.
259. 1 Mart. (o.s.) 297, 5 Am. Dec. 712, [1811 WL 986] (Super. Ct. of the Territory of Orleans
1811).
260. 1811 WL 986 at * 1.
261. Id. at *6.
262. Id. at * 1.
263. Id. at *4-5.
264, Id. at *6.
265, Id.
266. Id. at * 1.
267. Id. at*1O.
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harm caused by its invasion.
The first Supreme Court pronouncement of a privacy interest in a context
other than the Fourth Amendment was contemporaneous with the Warren and
Brandeis article. Its decision in Union Pacific Railway Co. v. Botsford268
concerned the question of whether a court could order a female plaintiff in a
personal injury action to submit to a physical examination by a surgeon. After
determining that federal law applied,269 the Court held that such examinations
were prohibited under long-recognized common law as a violation of
privacy. 27  A number of archaic principles were at play in Botsford, now
making it of only historical significance, but what is significant is the Court's
deliberation that the "common law" right to be let alone had a longstanding
tradition in this country. 271 The Court's passage on that common law tradition
is instructive:
No right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the
common law, than the right of every individual to the possession and
control of his own person, free from all restraint or interference of
others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law. As well
said by Judge Cooley, "The right to one's person may be said to be a
right of complete immunity: to be let alone.".. . For instance, not only
wearing apparel, but a watch or a jewel, worn on the person, is, for the
time being, privileged from being taken under distress for rent, or
attachment on mesne process, or execution for debt, or writ of
replevin....
The inviolability of the person is as much invaded by a
compulsory stripping and exposure as by a blow. To compel any one,
and especially a woman, to lay bare the body, or to submit it to the
touch of a stranger, without lawful authority, is an indignity, an assault
and a trespass; and no order or process, commanding such an exposure
or submission, was ever known to the common law in the
administration of justice between individuals, except in a very small
number of cases, based upon special reasons, and upon ancient
practice, coming down from ruder ages, now mostly obsolete in
England, and never, so far as we are aware, introduced into this
country. 272
The Court prohibited the lower court from ordering a physical
268. 141 U.S. 250 (1891).
269. Id. at 256.
270. Id. at 251.
271. Id. at 251-52.
272. Id.
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examination with reasoning that mirrored English Chief Justice Camden's,
that privacy is presumed and the interference must be expressly sanctioned by
the law.273 The Court also termed it the right "to be let alone," words adopted
by Warren and Brandeis.
274
The common law legal tradition of privacy owes much to The Right to
Privacy275 published by Warren and Brandeis, as does the legal philosophy
that developed during the twentieth century. The authors' "right to privacy,"
based on the slippery "right to be let alone," is congruent with the principles
memorialized in the Fourth Amendment. However, Warren and Brandeis's
purpose was different from that memorialized in the Constitution because it
relied more on a capitalist vision of individualism, rather than the traditionally
agrarian individualism associated with the Framers, particularly with
Jefferson.276 Rather than with the Founders' desire to control authority,
Warren and Brandeis were more concerned with a desire to control a
"commodity."
The Right to Privacy was, after all, a challenge to interference by
nongovernmental agents in the "private" lives of individuals. Warren and
Brandeis were concerned about increasingly sophisticated surveillance
technology and specifically attacked journalists' publications of photographs
and information concerning matters that "invaded the sacred precincts of
private and domestic life., 277 Protection against such invasion, they posited,
should be subject to common law protection, and they relied on the roots of
American autonomy in framing their right.278 However, they metamorphosed
that autonomy from roots of property law so that monetary damages could be
calculated for the invasion of that right.2 79 This article was instrumental in
273. Id.
274. Id. at 251.
275. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 174.
276. KLUCKHOHN, supra note 164, at 234.
277. JEFFREY ROSEN, THE UNWANTED GAZE: THE DESTRUCTION OF PRIVACY IN AMERICA 6-
7 (2000); Warren & Brandeis, supra note 174, at 76.
278. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 174, at 78-79; Turkington, supra note 180, at 482-83.
279. See generally Warren & Brandeis, supra note 174, at 80-86. Since the publication of The
Right to Privacy, personal space has become commoditized to a particular area around a person to
protect privacy, the most famous of which was delineated in Galella v. Onassis, 487 F.2d 986 (2d
Cir. 1973). Intimacy as a basis for defining privacy has also been described as a commodity by
which one creates relationships. See INNESS, supra note 2, at 81-82. Last, commodification is
developing in the context of private information. See, e.g., Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141, 148
(2000) (personal identifying information required for a driver's license is a "thing" for purposes of
the Commerce Clause); Vera Bergelson, It's Personal But Is It Mine? Toward Property Rights in
Personal Information, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 379 (2003); Julie Cohn, Examined Lives:
Informational Privacy and the Subject as. Object, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1373, 1378-1391 (2000);
Chlapowski, supra note 189, at 133; see generally Singleton, supra note 249.
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shaping a significant body of tort law. 280 However, it also has contributed in
some measure to the confusion in the patchwork nature of modem
constitutional privacy, the confusion that stems from whether privacy is a
commodity or is a state of being.28' Constitutional privacy as a state of
being-a liberty-has historically prevailed.
Nearly forty years after the publication of The Right to Privacy, then-
Justice Brandeis memorialized one of its themes in his dissent to Olmstead v.
United States. 28 2 Olmstead was a Fourth Amendment, wire-tapping case in
which the majority determined that telephone wires did not come under
constitutional protection.283 In dissent, Brandeis premised his version of
constitutional privacy on the "right to be let alone" theme of his law review
article. Instead of a corporeal measure of privacy suggested by the then-
traditional trespass jurisprudence, he outlined the broad transcendental nature
of individualism, a substantive version of the Constitution:
The protection guaranteed by the [a]mendments is much broader in
scope. The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions
favorable to the pursuit of happiness. They recognized the
significance of man's spiritual nature, of his feelings and of his
intellect. They knew that only a part of the pain, pleasure and
satisfactions of life are to be found in material things. They sought to
protect Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and
their sensations. They conferred, a& against the [g]ovemment, the
right to be let alone-the most comprehensive of rights and the right
most valued by civilized men. To protect that right, every
unjustifiable intrusion by the [g]overnment upon the privacy of the
individual, whatever the means employed, must be deemed a violation
of the Fourth Amendment.284
Indeed, Brandeis had transformed the property "interest" of the right to be left
alone into an autonomy interest of constitutional significance and thereby
concentrated not on the right, but on the government's invasion.
As the twentieth century progressed, the civil legal tradition of privacy
began to reflect concerns that were less related to spatial-territorial questions
280. E.g., William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REv. 383 (1960).
281. See generally BRETr, supra note 67, at 3-6. There exist numerous philosophical debates
between the objective characterization of a right and the subjective characterization of a liberty. Id.
282. 277 U.S. 438 (1928), overruled in part by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353
(1967); Gormley, supra note 2, at 1360-61.
283. 277 U.S. at 464-65.
284. Id. at 478-79 (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
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and more related to psychic questions 285 as Americans' lives became more
regulated in an increasingly crowded nation. As a result, plaintiffs' suits
opposing government regulation not only opposed an interference but posed
the problems of how that psychic privacy was valued by the courts.
Olmstead's dissent may have most clearly postulated the substantive liberty
interest, but earlier cases started the ball rolling. Lawrence v. Texas neatly
packaged the chronology of those transcendental privacy-as-liberty cases,
starting with Meyer v. Nebraska.286
One of the earliest cases to delineate privacy and government regulation
by means of substantive due process under the Fourteenth Amendment is
Meyer v. Nebraska. Meyer was convicted of teaching reading in German to a
ten-year-old child in violation of a Nebraska statute that criminalized the
teaching of any subject in any language other than English until after the
eighth grade.287 In overturning that conviction, the Court embarked on its
perilous journey of defining the interest in teaching German as a liberty
guaranteed under the Fourteenth Amendment. 288 The Court recognized the
liberties in a teacher's right to teach and in a parents' right to engage a teacher
for such responsibility and thus to control their children's education 289 and
concluded that government may not interfere with those liberties without
having some reasonable purpose in doing so. 290 And although conceding a
state's interest in promoting civic development through their schools, the
Court particularly decried state efforts to achieve a homogeneity of children
through the means that Nebraska had adopted.2 9' Instead, the statute was held
285. See, e.g., Lawrence K. Frank, Cultural Control and Physiological Autonomy, in
PERSONALITY IN NATURE, SOCIETY, AND CULTURE 119, 122 (Clyde Kluckhohn & Henry A. Murray
eds., 2d ed. 1971).
286. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
287. Id. at 397.
288. Id. at 399.
289. Id. at 400-01. The Court extrapolated these rights by defining "liberty" in nonexclusive
terms:
While this court has not attempted to define with exactness the liberty thus guaranteed [by
the Fourteenth Amendment], the term has received much consideration and some of the
included things have been definitely stated. Without doubt, it denotes not merely freedom
from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the
common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and
bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and
generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the
orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.
Id. at 399.
290. Id. at 399-400.
291. Id. at 402.
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to be an unreasonable use of the state's police power to achieve good
citizens.292 The Court thereby created a demarcation between the power of
the state and the autonomy of the individual through the liberty protected by
the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Court tackled a similar issue in Pierce v. Society of Sisters.2 93 The
problem posed in that case was the constitutionality of an Oregon compulsory
education act that required all children between the ages of eight and sixteen
to attend public schools.294 Two private educational institutions that were
losing matriculants as a result of the statute initiated suits for injunctive relief
295to prohibit its enforcement. Relying on Meyer v. Nebraska, the Court
determined that this statute, too, unreasonably interfered with the liberty
guaranteed under the Fourteenth Amendment, most specifically
acknowledging a liberty in parents to "direct the upbringing and education of
children." 296 Once again, the Constitution was the guarantor of individual
autonomy: "The fundamental theory of liberty upon which all governments in
this Union repose excludes any general power of the [s]tate to standardize its
children by forcing them to accept instruction from public teachers only."
297
According to the Lawrence Court, forty years passed before the next
298major test to conceptualize privacy in the Fourteenth Amendment arose,
although it was conceptualized in a slightly different way as an explicit right
of privacy in Griswold v. Connecticut.2 99 The dispute was occasioned by
Connecticut's criminal statute that forbade the use of contraceptives and the
counseling to provide information about contraceptives. 300  The executive
director and medical director of Connecticut's Planned Parenthood League
were arrested and convicted of being accessories to the offenses as they gave
information and medical devices to married couples concerning
contraception. 30 1 The defendants challenged the accessory statute as violative
292. Id. at 403.
293. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
294. Id at 530.
295. Id. at 530-33.
296. Id at 534-35.
297. Id. at 535. The Court then commented that "[t]he child is not the mere creature of the
State; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to
recognize and prepare him for additional obligations." Id.
298. See generally id. at 564.
299. 381 U.S. 479 (1965); see generally G. Sidney Buchanan, The Right of Privacy: Past,
Present and Future, 16 OHIo N.U. L. REv. 403 (1989) (setting out a comprehensive background to
Griswold and to its progeny).
300. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 480.
301. Id.
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of the Fourteenth Amendment.3 °2 In an apparent sidestep to avoid criticisms
inuring to substantive due process, Justice Douglas's opinion instead
recognized a "right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights," the privacy
inhering in the marital relationship arising from the "penumbras" of rights
303inherent in the Constitution. He asserted the marital relationship is within a
"zone of privacy" in which the government may not interfere in such fashion
as to imperil the relationship by police searches for contraceptives.
304
Connecticut's statute instead was an unnecessarily broad use of the state's
police power, a power that would adversely affect the confidential
relationship between husband and wife.305 Thus, the legal tradition of privacy
as a constitutional liberty became a bit side-tracked with Griswold.
30 6
Griswold's right to marital privacy-an enunciated and therefore
measurable "group" autonomy-was mutated in Eisenstadt v. Baird3°7 to
include individuals and revived, to a degree, the syllogism of privacy as
autonomy. In Eisenstadt v. Baird, the defendant deliberately provoked his
arrest and conviction for unlawful distribution of a contraceptive when he
gave a package of vaginal foam to a young, unmarried woman as he closed a
lecture on birth control at Boston University.30 8 Although the Court's
302. Id. at 481.
303. Id. at 486.
304. Id. at 485.
305. Id. at 481. Douglas's perambulation through the law to achieve this result required the
recognition of a right peripheral to the specific rights secured by the Constitution and the Bill of
Rights. These he dubbed "penumbral rights," rights that the Framers assumed to exist but simply did
not enumerate. The legal legerdemain by which the Court could recognize these penumbras under
the Fourteenth Amendment, he posited, was the breadth of the Court's previous interpretations of the
First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments. Because these Amendments had at one time or
another generated controversies for which the word "privacy" was placed in an opinion, the Court
had created a broad net of legal protections over a zone of privacy, or "penumbral rights of 'privacy
and repose."' Id. at 485. Douglas's analysis of precedent included First Amendment associational
privacy from NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958); Third Amendment freedom from quartering
soldiers; Fourth Amendment privacy guarantees set forth in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961);
specific guarantees from unreasonable search and seizure; and the Fifth Amendment guarantee
against self-incrimination. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 482-85. The Ninth Amendment was reserved as
the catch-all: even if the right is not enumerated, the Constitution should not be construed as denying
other rights. Id. at 484. The Griswold decision is more in the nature of the protection of an
"unenumerated" right under the Constitution, an acceptable function of the Constitution in its
"historical commitment ... as a community of enduring principle." Richards, supra note 45, at 839.
306. But see 381 U.S. at 486-87 (Goldberg, J., concurring). The concurrence of Justice
Goldberg instead mentions the liberty interest set out in the Fourteenth Amendment as encompassing
the right of marital privacy. Id. at 486-87 (Goldberg, J., concurring). Goldberg placed great weight
on the reservation of rights in the Ninth Amendment, attempting to elevate that Amendment from
flabby disuse, as an interpretive measure that the Bill of Rights is not exhaustive. Id. at 490-92
(Goldberg, J., concurring).
307. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
308. Id. at 440, 445.
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decision ultimately rested on the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection
Clause,30 9 it also offered one significant policy rationale for striking down the
statutes based on the right to privacy set forth in Griswold v. Connecticut:
Griswold could not be interpreted to protect only the marital couple, but also
to protect the individual member with a right "to be free from unwarranted
governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the
decision whether to bear or beget a child.
'310
Eisenstadt's recognition of individual privacy set the stage for Roe v.
Wade,311 which conceptualized personal privacy amidst the controversy over
criminalizing abortions and declared that a woman has a constitutional "right
of personal privacy [that] includes the abortion decision.'3 12  The exact
dimensions of that "right" are not set out nor is the underlying constitutional
rationale very clear; Justice Blackmun's opinion is an olio of reasoning. 313
However, he did make clear that the chief justification for striking down the
Texas statute was the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause and its
substantive liberty interests314  and declared this privacy interest a
"fundamental" personal privacy right that may only be overborne by a
compelling state interest.
315
There followed a plethora of attacks on the personal privacy right outlined
in Roe v. Wade as states kept chipping away by adding special "provisions" to
a woman's private right to decide whether or not to have an abortion.
309. The Court determined that no rational ground existed for the statutes' differential
treatment of unmarried individuals from that of similarly situated married couples. Id. at 446-47,
454-55.
310. Id. at 453.
311. 410U.S. 113 (1973).
312. Id. at 154.
313. Blackmun began his exegesis by acknowledging that the Constitution contains no explicit
right to privacy then traced the historical development of the Court's tradition of loosely interpreting
constitutional provisions to find privacy rights hidden in the Amendments. He also acknowledged
Justice Douglas's "penumbras" formulation. However, he reserved most emphasis for the liberty
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment as originated in Meyer v. Nebraska. To this tenet he
attributed discrete personal rights that are .' implicit in the concept of ordered liberty."' Id. at 152
(quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937), overruled by Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S.
784 (1969)). Pursuing this theme, he enumerated-as worthy of protection-marital activities,
procreation, contraception, family relationships, child-rearing, and education. Id. at 152-53; see
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. at 453-54; Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967); Prince v.
Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944); Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel Williamson, 316 U.S. 535,
541-42 (1942); Pierce v. Society of the Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262
U.S. at 399. Although somewhat reserved on the actual decisional fulcrum-Blackmun accepted that
the Ninth Amendment might also be a basis for recognizing privacy as a reserved right-he primarily
relied on the Fourteenth Amendment's liberty interest and the congruent restrictions on government
interference as the basis for his decision. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 153.
314. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 153.
315. Id. at 155.
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Pennsylvania, for example, required informed consent, a twenty-four-hour
waiting period, parental consent for minors, state recordkeeping requirements,
and spousal notification. 3 6 Several abortion providers sought a declaration of
that statute's unconstitutionality in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pennsylvania v. Casey.317 A fractured Court struck down only Pennsylvania's
spousal notification provision as an undue burden on a woman's privacy
rights,31 8 but did reaffirm the privacy rights of Roe v. Wade,3 19 now more
candidly described as a liberty interest:
Liberty finds no refuge in a jurisprudence of doubt. Yet 19 years after
our holding that the Constitution protects a woman's right to terminate
her pregnancy in its early stages,... that definition of liberty is still
questioned.32
Our Constitution is a covenant running from the first generation of
Americans to us and then to future generations. It is a coherent
succession. Each generation must learn anew that the Constitution's
written terms embody ideas and aspirations that must survive more
ages than one. We accept our responsibility not to retreat from
interpreting the full meaning of the covenant in light of all of our
precedents. We invoke it once again to define the freedom guaranteed
by the Constitution's own promise, the promise of liberty.32
Justice O'Connor's liberty jurisprudence is firmly rooted in the Fourteenth
Amendment322 and evinced no reservation that liberty is the substantive well-
spring for personal autonomy, 323 and therefore its ancillary value, privacy.
The imprimatur for this liberty interest-and the simplest characterization
of constitutional privacy as a more general principle relying on individual
autonomy-finally occurred with Lawrence v. Texas. More than 200 years
316. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 844 (1992).
317. Id.
318. Id. at 898. The "undue burden" restriction on state interference in this liberty interest
rejected the clear lines drawn by the trimesters framework elucidated in Roe v. Wade. Id. at 873.
This test examines whether a state's regulation of the liberty has "the purpose or effect of placing a
substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus." Id. at 877.
319. Id. at879.
320. Id. at 844.
321. Id. at901.
322. Id. at 846.
323. "At the heart of liberty is the right to define one's own concept of existence, of meaning,
of the universe, and of the mystery of human life. Beliefs about these matters could not define the
attributes of personhood were they formed under compulsion of the State." Id. at 851.
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after the Constitution was drafted, the Court has fully embraced the M5bius
Strip that the Founders were wise enough not to enumerate-liberty is
autonomy is privacy is autonomy is liberty. Thus, in further Escher-like
fashion, the legal tradition of privacy has come full circle. Although
Lawrence v. Texas was limited to a particular interference with constitutional
privacy, its explication of constitutional privacy as a constitutional liberty-
eloquently foreshadowed by Justice O'Connor in Casey-serves as the
singular, most easily explicated proof for the generalized constitutional
protection of privacy. That template assumes that constitutional privacy is a
substantive liberty, with few contours, perhaps, but necessarily so as not to
have to anticipate each government interference.
It also can be summoned up to challenge the unwarranted governmental
intrusions that often accompany children's privacy interests in education. The
presumption of privacy as a constitutional liberty is essential for children in
school because there they are wholly embraced by the government. A couple
of contours to this liberty must be sculpted, if for no other purpose than to
remind the government when it is and is not in charge. But that children are
entitled to expect the protection of their constitutional privacy has no less
historical practice and background-albeit little legal tradition-than for
adults.324
III. CHILDREN AND PRIVACY
As one studies the practices and historical traditions of childhood
privacy-of which education privacy is just one part-it becomes apparent
that something somewhat less metaphysical is necessary to define exactly
what its legal tradition is, or should be. A child's understanding of privacy is
only slightly more abstract than that of animals. In early childhood years, the
sentient notion of privacy does not go much deeper than instinct-borne more
of physical autonomy than of anything else. As children mature, the
abstraction is more apparent as children reach adolescence and can better
verbalize ideas about themselves and their personal autonomy. However, the
lack of abstraction and advanced communication skills should not deprive
younger children of a right or liberty to privacy. Perhaps for those reasons,
the law has done a poor job of defining exactly what children's privacy
interests should be while in school.
Regardless of the child's "subjective" expectation of privacy, the state is
324. Indeed, an examination of children's practices and historical background might make
explicating adult privacy a bit easier because children's views of privacy tend to be less abstract and
more practical.
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still required to be protective of her privacy interests. 325  For that, the
Lawrence v. Texas framework for expostulating practices, history, and legal
traditions is useful in tracing a child's liberty interest in privacy as part and
parcel of American autonomy, and therefore of American privacy.
The history of Western Civilization reveals that, at least until the
seventeenth century, children were considered miniature adults, not as a state
of mental immaturity. 326 Childhood accomplishments were hailed as a mirror
of adult accomplishments.327 Indeed, the recognition of childhood as a
distinct social category spans only the past 400 years, developing the
distinction upon the formalization of schools and the recognition of the
familial social unit as separate from the larger community. By the "modern"
era, the sociocultural separateness of children from adults was recognized.328
The American colonial cultural norm of children's privacy grew primarily
from the functioning of the family unit and the functioning of privacy within
that unit. Bowing to the differentiated status of children, colonial adults
granted them varying degrees of privacy in accordance with their ages, thus
varying through the spectrum of infancy to adolescence. 329  The Puritan
community ethos emphasized social control over its members so surveillance
of children was a family function. Thus, Puritan households tended to strictly
control children so they would not misbehave. But the realities of the
family's survival would not allow round-the-clock surveillance. As parents
worked on the farm and in the household, children were often left to their own
devices-or assumed to be self-sufficient-and had a great deal of autonomy,
and thus privacy. Surveillance later became more linked to the child's own
325. See Darryl H. v. Coler, 801 F.2d 893, 901 (7th Cir. 1986) ("A child of very tender years
may not exhibit a subjective expectation of privacy in the same sense as an older child. He is,
however, a human being, entitled to be treated by the state in a manner compatible with that human
dignity.").
326. GERGEN, supra note 184, at 11-12; see also PHILIPPE ARItS, CENTURIES OF CHILDHOOD:
A SOCIAL HISTORY OF FAMILY LIFE 32, 46 (1962) (noting that seventeenth-century art began to
evoke themes of childhood qua childhood). Medieval society lacked an awareness of the distinction
between childhood and adulthood, an awareness that began to change with the practice of "coddling"
children. Id. at 128, 132. In addition, several cultures marked the movement from childhood to
adulthood at puberty, a much younger age than Americans traditionally consider the onset of
adulthood. See, e.g., Wallace J. Mlyniec, A Judge's Ethical Dilemma: Assessing a Child's Capacity
to Choose, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1873, 1876-77 (1996).
327. J.H. VAN DEN BERG, THE CHANGING NATURE OF MAN: INTRODUCTION TO A HISTORICAL
PSYCHOLOGY 28 (1961).
328. VAN MANEN & LEVERING, supra note 4, at 139. The "privacy" accorded to a family
unit-or at least a unit smaller than the community-may have been instrumental in separately
classifying children as different from adults. This contrasts with our current beliefs that biological
and psychological growth distinguishes them. Id.
329. FLAHERTY, supra note 143, at 49.
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economic independence from the family unit. 330 By the eighteenth century,
personal autonomy arrived sooner than for today's children as colonial
adolescents became less economically dependent upon their parents and thus
differentiated from the family unit and away from its surveillance.
331
Modem views of childhood are now less linked to economic
independence and more linked to chronological development, 332 particularly
with universal education until adolescence. As a result, American society's
perception of the age of autonomy has changed somewhat. Surveillance of
children in the household is still prevalent as a matter for social control, but
children's privacy in modem America has also become a matter of instilling
cultural norms of privacy at developmental stages. Through the agent of
culture, children learn early respect for private property and "the sanctity of
the person., 333  By the age of two, children begin to sense the distinction
between autonomy and dependence. 334 Indeed, contemporary concerns have
increased awareness about the sanctity of a child's body in the numerous
"good touch-bad touch" programs conducted to prevent, or at least to assist in
prosecution of, child molestation charges.335 During the early elementary
grades, children develop more abstract privacy concerns with a significant
shift in attention from simple spatial privacy to more sophisticated ideas of
their own autonomy. This autonomy may exhibit itself in various perceived,
albeit primitive, rights-like the right to play-that later metamorphose into
other concepts of liberty, like the freedoms of movement and
336decisionmaking.
33
330. Id. at 55-57.
331. Id. at 58.
332. See generally Maxine Wolfe, Childhood and Privacy, in CHILDREN AND THE
ENVIRONMENT 175, 183-90 (Irwin Altman & Joachim F. Wohlwill eds., 1978).
333. Frank, supra note 285, at 121. "[M]an exists as an organism in a common public
world.., but each individual lives in his private world of meanings and feelings, derived from the
impact of culture that takes place in the specific personal relations between cultural agents and the
child." Id. at 122 (emphasis in original); see also Lee, supra note 170, at 339.
334. Erikson, supra note 170, at 185, 203.
335. Sexual exploitation of children is perceived as a violation of their privacy. People v.
Gagnon, 997 P.2d 1278, 1282 (Colo. Ct. App. 1999); Perry v. Commonwealth, 780 N.E.2d 53, 56-57
n.5 (Mass. 2002); see also New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 759 n.10 (1982) (determining that
child pornography violates the right to avoid disclosure of personal matters); accord United States v.
Sherman, 268 F.3d 539, 547 (7th Cir. 2001), cert. denied 536 U.S. 963 (2002) (chastising
government entrapment procedures of disseminating child pornography during the course of a federal
investigation); cf Darryl H. v. Coler, 801 F.2d 893, 901 (7th Cir. 1986) (holding that a welfare
department examination of a child for an abuse investigation is a significant intrusion on the child's
privacy and governed by the Fourth Amendment).
336. Gary B. Melton & Susan B. Limber, What Children's Rights Mean to Children:
Children's Own Views, in THE IDEOLOGIES OF CHILDREN'S RIGHTS 167, 178-79 (Michael Freeman
& Philip Veerman eds., 1992).
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These chronological abstractions of privacy are, in large part, the products
of children's sociocultural experience. Everyday experiences teach children
about privacy as they are exposed to different interactions with themselves
and their information.33 7 Children eventually experience fewer intrusions in
their lives as they grow older, their social (and perhaps economic)
independence increases, and their need for adult supervision decreases.
Eventually, privacy is a volition for the growing child rather than a condition
subject to the "whim" of her caretaker. By adolescence, children are acutely
aware of the significance of privacy, both territorial and informational.338
Childhood privacy practices are therefore inextricably intertwined in the
child's developing cultural sense of autonomy in her upbringing.
Equally important to the development of abstractions of privacy are the
actual chronological and physiological experiences of growth. As opposed to
the medieval views of children as miniature adults, modem biological and
psychological theories conclude that childhood is a developmental stage on
the path to adulthood. 339 During that development, children's biological and
psychological growth implicates the concurrent maturational and intellectual
changes that lead ineluctably to their need for greater autonomy, and thus, for
privacy, in order to function as adults.
340
One pioneer in studying children's intellectual development was Jean
Piaget, who posited that knowledge is a process and that a child's knowledge
changes as his cognitive abilities change. 34 1 Although simplistic, 342 Piaget's
developmental stages provide some glimpse into childhood as an incremental
development of the organism's sense of autonomy. Piaget based his cognitive
337. Gary B. Melton, Minors and Privacy: Are Legal and Psychological Concepts
Compatible?, 62 NEB. L. REV. 455,487 (1983).
338. Id. at 487-88.
339. DAVID ARCHARD, CHILDREN: RIGHTS & CHILDHOOD 29-31 (1993). For some,
childhood requires the development of its own distinct world with its own set of rules while others
view it as simply one stage in a continuum. Id. at 31. To the extent that liberty and privacy have
universal meanings and application, the child-as-separate-entity seems inappropriate.
340. The extant literature on children's developmental psychology and privacy is sparse. See,
e.g., Melton, Minors & Privacy, supra note 337, at 486; Wolfe, supra note 332, at 175.
341. PATRICIA H. MILLER, THEORIES OF DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY 38-39 (1983).
Piaget's developmental psychology is rooted in biology. Id. at 40. Piaget's four major stages may
also have a certain universality among and between cultures, taking into account actual physical
maturation, the physical environment, and social experience. Id. at 82-83. However, there is some
debate about the simplicity of the nearly mathematical precision of his developmental states. Id. at
96-97.
342. Piaget is criticized as being overly simplistic and not giving sufficient weight to social as
opposed to genetic influences. Neil Bolton, Educational Psychology and the Politics and Practice of
Education, in REFOCUSING EDUCATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY 165, 169 (Neville Jones & Norah
Frederickson eds., 1990).
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stages on several universal characteristics of each step, one such universality
being selfhood, "coming-into-being and a being." 343 Eighteen to twenty-four
months is the sensorimotor stage during which children begin to view
themselves as separate from their environment and therefore as autonomous
beings.34 4  Between the ages of two and seven, the child is in her
"preoperational period" during which one of the characteristics is
egocentrism, the cognitive rudiments of self.345 Piaget's third period is the
"concrete operational period"-between seven to eleven years-when
children move from a primitive view of the world to an increasingly more
logical view, internalizing representation rather than just action.346 During the
last period, from eleven to fifteen, children engage in greater abstract
reasoning and problem-solving, the formal operational period.347  Piaget's
four developmental stages thus roughly coincide with children's absorption of
increasingly sophisticated cultural norms of privacy.
Similarly, Erik Erikson formulated psychosocial stages of human
development through a study of identity that is instructive in viewing the
maturation of human concepts of autonomy and thus of privacy. 348 Erikson's
emphasis on identity dealt with the individual's understanding of self and its
place in society. 349  These "eight ages of man" are a function of the
individual's struggle for identity, usually in balancing the individual self with
its culture.350  A recurring theme in these "ages" is the increasing sense of
autonomy, beginning at two years old and culminating in the teenage years.
As soon as infants begin to identify "me" and "mine," they are moving toward
343. MILLER, supra note 341, at 43. The five specific characteristics of each of Piaget's stages
of development are: (1) each stage is an integrated whole; (2) each stage naturally flows from the
previous stage; (3) each stage follows a particular sequence of development; (4) the stages are
species-universal; and (5) each stage "creates" a being. Id. at 42-43.
344. Id. at 50-53.
345. Id. at 53-59.
346. Id. at 59-62.
347. Id. at 65-68; see also Mlyniec, supra note 326, at 1878-83. Developmental phases of
children have influenced judicial considerations of their ability to make decisions. Children under
ten are not considered rational enough to make considered decisions while children above fourteen
are considered final arbiters. Id. at 1915; Richard E. Redding, Children's Competence to Provide
Informed Consent for Mental Health Treatment, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 695, 726-27 (1993).
348. MILLER, supra note 341, at 160-63.
349. Id. at 163-64.
350. Erikson's eight stages of man are: (1) trust vs. mistrust (birth to one year); (2) autonomy
vs. shame and doubt (two to three years); (3) initiative vs. guilt (four to five years); (4) industry vs.
inferiority (six years to puberty); (5) identity vs. role confusion (adolescence); (6) intimacy vs.
isolation (young adulthood); (7) generativity vs. stagnation (middle adulthood); and (8) ego
integrity vs. despair (late adulthood). ERIK H. ERIKSON, CHILDHOOD AND SOCIETY 247-74 (2d ed.
1963); MILLER, supra note 341, at 165-71.
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a natural autonomy from their parents. 351 By adolescence, children are
establishing a dominant ego identity and developing self-concept and self-
esteem.352 This later stage is a particularly critical aspect of the cultural
phenomenon of American identity: "[T]he functioning American, as the heir
of a history of extreme contrasts and abrupt changes, bases his final ego
identity on some tentative combination of dynamic polarities such as
migratory and sedentary, individualistic and standardized, competitive and co-
operative, pious and freethinking, responsible and cynical. 353 Consequently,
an understanding of American privacy is incomplete without an understanding
of its cultural and chronological development in children.
The conclusion derived from these chronological developments is that
children experience an increasing sense of autonomy in their bodies as well as
in their decisionmaking.354 Very young children have difficulty in the
conscious recognition of private space and private information. However,
parallel to their psychological and social development, they learn the
boundaries of personal space and the privacy of information.355 Eventually,
children view their worlds as distinct from those of the remaining members of
the family unit. They have as differing reactions to being touched as they do
to being "ready" for toilet training. "No" and "mine" are articulable instances
of both individuality and autonomy exhibited by children as they mature. As
their intellectual development proceeds apace, their ideas become more
individuated and their private space more definitive. The developments may
differ by family and even by individual, but the progression is fairly uniform
from concrete to abstract ideas of privacy.
A particular catalyst for a child's abstraction of privacy is secrecy. If
privacy is considered a generalized zone to which access is denied, then
351. ERIKSON, CHILDHOOD & SOCIETY, supra note 350, at 82.
352. Id. at 306; KELVIN SEIFERT, EDUCATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY 116 (1983).
353. ERIKSON, CHILDHOOD & SOCIETY, supra note 350, at 286.
354. There are numerous competing theories of developmental psychology. ARCHARD, supra
note 340, at 32-36; see generally MILLER, supra note 341. But Erikson and Piaget highlight the
proposition that children's autonomy is a psychological as well as a social construct in modem
Western culture.
355. This parallel development of notions of private space can be observed:
Those who have been around young children know that they often come too close or not
close enough in different instances. Sometimes they breathe in your face as they talk; at
other times they blurt out intimacies in loud voices at great distances. Children seem to
learn only gradually the appropriate distances to maintain from others in different social
situations. But the available research data indicate that they do learn how to manage
personal space and that the learning is quite comprehensive and parallel to their learning of
other social skills.
ALTMAN, supra note 110, at 67.
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secrecy is the attachment of "privacy" to a particular piece of information. 356
If privacy is a negative concept-the right to be left alone or refusing access
to personal separateness-secrecy is a "positive" relational concept: a secret is
usually a referent for something that is hidden.3 57 Secrets are not a bad
thing,358 but they are a unique characteristic of humans. There are a multitude
of secrets: "clandestine actions, sacred practices, stashing a cache, veiling
one's eyes, masking an intention, covering a deception, disguising an
emotion, sheltering a treasure." 359 Secrecy is learned early in childhood and is
exhibited in games of peek-a-boo and hide-and-seek. Children also revel in
building tents and forts in the backyard and otherwise having secret hideouts
and hiding places, such as closets. These secret places become the "domain"
of the child in which she can engage in solitary, secret activities, such as
daydreaming. 360 There is also a multitude of motives for secrets, some good
and some bad, with varying moods, emotions, meanings, and values ascribed
to them.
Secrecy evolves congruent with privacy although children grasp earlier
the concept of secrecy. Both are products of identity and development, but
secrecy-as a relational experience-has more "concreteness" to a child.36'
Such generalized discernment of and need for secret places eventually
evolves-by kindergarten and first grade-into an understanding of how to
keep a secret.362 The function of childhood secrecy eventually evolves into
guilt for exposure of debt, shame for exposure of fault, and embarrassment for
exposure of innocence.363 Thus, related to childhood privacy and secrecy is
356. VAN MANEN & LEVERING, supra note 4, at 69-70. Van Manen and Levering view
privacy as more metaphorical than real, insofar as children are concerned. "Privacy may have more
to do with what falls under the control of one's personal sphere than with specific messages or
content that are intentionally concealed." Id. at 70.
357. Id at 10, 65; ANITA E. KELLY, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SECRETS 4-5 (2002).
358. Unless, of course, government accountability is limited by government secrecy. Personal
privacy and government secrecy have opposite roles. The greater government secrecy is hoarded, the
less personal privacy is recognized. Marc Rotenberg, Privacy and Secrecy After September 11, 86
MINN. L. REV. 1115, 1126-33 (2002).
359. VAN MANEN & LEVERING, supra note 4, at 10.
360. See generally id. at 20-35; Josip Novakovich, Secret Spaces of Childhood, in THE
PRIVATE I: PRIVACY IN A PUBLIC WORLD 23-27 (Molly Peacock ed., 2001).
361. VAN MANEN & LEVERING, supra note 4, at 90-98.
362. Id. at 107-08.
363. Id. at 142-48. Hyper-secrecy has been linked to physiological as well as psychological
problems. See, e.g., KELLY, supra note 357, at 41-65. By adulthood, one of the relational
experiences most identified with privacy and the government is personal secrecy, when one chooses
not to reveal information about others. VAN MANEN & LEVERING, supra note 4, at 10-11. The
"experiences" of this relational secrecy have been categorized as (1) existential secrecy (the inability
to completely know another individual); (2) communicative secrecy (the inability to articulate one's
inner life and turmoil); and (3) personal secrecy (the choice of refusing to share information with
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stigma, "an undesired differentness from what we had anticipated. '3"64 A
child's idea of stigma is perhaps more diffuse than particularized stigmas
perceived by adults. Nonetheless, stigma remains a concern in the clash of
the public-private persona of schoolchildren and the inevitable clash in the
school environment where children are learning to become private while their
achievements are judged in a public forum.
These practices and historical background reveal that children's privacy,
as both primitive and abstract concepts, has ancients roots sufficient to trace
its existence back to colonial America. The proliferation of developmental
literature has traced cultural, biological, and psychological roots of American
autonomy to our children. We develop our adult conceptions of privacy and
autonomy as both a function of our humanity and as a unique function of our
"American-ness." However, Americans are expected to develop much of our
identity and autonomy as a function of cultural norms instilled in our schools,
a place where, ironically, privacy is not afforded much recognition.
IV. THE CRECHE OF AMERICAN PRIVACY
The majority of American children spend their childhood in public
schools. Children are private customers in a government enterprise, and
sometimes their distinct privacy interests are ignored, although more by
benignity than by malignity. The irony is that the unique universality of the
American educational system was specifically designed to encourage that
cultural autonomy forming the basis for our privacy. Personal autonomy, for
its own sake, is important to the creation of good citizens, especially in
principles that encourage democratic participation. As a result, modem
Western educational thought developed concurrently with political thought.
Indeed, they correlate: Political participation requires the nurturing of the
citizen through educational participation. Several philosopher-educators were
instrumental in shaping the American public school experience that
encouraged individual autonomy for schoolchildren.
Enlightenment in economic, political, and legal developments included
the philosophical treatment of education as a necessary corollary. John Locke
and Jean-Jacques Rousseau both believed that education had a critical place in
their political philosophies. In tune with his belief in the natural liberties and
rights of man, Locke emphasized education's role in giving children
experience, and thus, the ability to exercise reason because, for Locke,
others). Id. at 10-14. "Keeping secrets means to hide deliberately information from other
people .... Secrecy also has been called 'active inhibition of disclosure' ... and one's predisposition
to engage in secrecy has been labeled 'self-concealment'...." KELLY, supra note 357, at 3.
364. GOFFMAN, supra note 191, at 5.
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365freedom is the inherent result of reason. Rousseau's educational theories
also reflected his political thought and emphasized the "natural" state of
children and the natural progression of their development and behavior:
Rousseau espoused permissiveness and allowing children the greatest freedom
to express themselves. 366 The more moderate Lockean vision of education
was the one formally "adopted" in the American experience; however,
Rousseau's vision facilitated that experience by encouraging child-centered
education.
John Locke's vision of education most profoundly affected Thomas
Jefferson's special contribution to American education. Jefferson believed
that public education was the best way of inculcating his republican ideals, the
rights of men, and the limits on government.367 His ultimate vision was to
educate the common man and included both basic pedagogical goals of
literacy, mathematics, and history, as well as civics instruction to train leaders
and to advance liberty. 368 Similarly, Benjamin Franklin's utilitarian view of
365. ARCHARD, supra note 339, at 6. Locke believed that adults possess the ability to exercise
reason but that children do not. Reason was a state of mind, not a developmental stage: children are
born with reason but require experience to exercise it. Id. Believing children are like miniature
adults, he opined that, although children have the same innate cognitive ability as adults, they must
be educated to exercise reason. Id. at 3-6. Locke optimistically postulated that children are willing,
indeed eager, to "experience" reason through education. VAN DEN BERG, supra note 327, at 22. He
also optimistically believed that children should be educated only when the inclination strikes them.
JOHN LOCKE, SOME THOUGHTS CONCERNING EDUCATION 134-35 (John W. Yolton & Jean S.
Yolton eds., Oxford Univ. Press 1989).
366. In contrast to Locke, Rousseau believed that reason is the end effect of education, the
result of children's maturation. He therefore departed from Locke's treatment of children as little
adults and firmly placed them in a developmental continuum. VAN DEN BERG, supra note 327, at 23.
Rousseau's theory that children are not mature adults was among the bedrock principles for
encouraging their education. Id Rousseau stressed education for its own sake; his education theory
emphasized the "natural" state of children and the natural progression of their development and
behavior. GUTEK, supra note 172, at 120-27. Rousseau's philosophies were later adopted by the
American transcendentalists and their views on progressive education. See, e.g., CLARENCE J.
KARIER, MAN, SOCIETY, AND EDUCATION 55-57 (1967) Although both Rousseau and Locke
influenced modem educational practices, Rousseau's reasoning seems messy and at times
contradictory. Hence, the American educational experience adopted the more moderate Lockean
tradition for schools. Id. at 40. However, the Rousseau tradition influenced teaching methods.
367. Id. at 27-28; GUTEK, supra note 172, at 171.
368. GUTEK, supra note 172, at 171-74; KARIER, supra note 366, at 30-32; LAWRENCE A.
CREMrN, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN EDUCATION 5-6 (1965). The underpinnings for American
public education are traceable to the public responsibility of the Puritans and early New England
Poor Laws enacted to secure training for the poor. Those responsibilities and laws placed the burden
on local governance to assure that parents and guardians taught their children basic literacy, religion,
and a trade or occupation. Local school districts sprouted up in the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries. By the nineteenth century, Puritan theocracy had been secularized so that education
thought became influenced more by Enlightenment philosophy. KARIER, supra note 366, at 11, 13-
14,21.
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education abandoned the classical tradition of education in order to better
serve the more secular needs of the middle class: that education is the source
of success in America.3 69 Neither Jefferson nor Franklin saw their ideas come
to complete fruition, but their ideas sowed the seeds of the unique universality
and democratic imperatives driving American education.37 °
Similar altruistic and civic goals were the catalysts for nineteenth and
twentieth-century American reformers who extended the principle that
schools serve a fundamental governmental role to teach good citizenry and
that the methods for doing so must emphasize individual autonomy. A leader
of the common school movement, nineteenth-century reformer Horace Mann
was motivated by humanitarian as well as Jeffersonian traditions. To Mann,
schools should reflect the republican tradition of educating citizens to govern
themselves and of training them to be good citizens. 37' Thus, Mann embraced
two principle tenets for common schools: they should be socially integrative
and they should be public.372 These public schools would, Mann surmised, be
more competitive than private schools and would teach common elements of
American culture: reading, writing, arithmetic, grammar, geography, spelling,
health, music, art, and history373 -subjects that remain the core of modem
public school tradition.374 American schools thereby would provide a "civic"
education and make education a civic function.
The other significant influence on American educational theory was John
369. HENRY J. PERKINSON, TWO HUNDRED YEARS OF AMERICAN EDUCATIONAL THOUGHT
3-5, 15 (1976).
370. KARIER, supra note 366, at 33-35. After his efforts to reform public elementary and
secondary schools in Virginia were frustrated, he turned his attention to higher education. Jefferson
did live to see the first class enter the University of Virginia in 1825. GUTEK, supra note 172, at
173-74.
371. GUTEK, supra note 172, at 207.
372. Id. at 207-08; KARIER, supra note 366, at 58-61; Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, "Who
Owns the Child? ": Meyer and Pierce and the Child as Property, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 995,
1006 (1992). Although arising out of what might ordinarily be considered liberal notions, Mann's
common schools adopted the ethos of Evangelical Protestantism as the underlying standard for
teaching such moral values as hard work, honesty, and thrift. GUTEK, supra note 172, at 209;
KARIER, supra note 366, at 63-64.
373. Mann's efforts seem to have been a compromise of the entrenched positions between the
upper classes' demands for state support for their private schools and the state pauper schools for the
poor. CREM[N, supra note 368, at 86; GUTEK, supra note 172, at 209; KARIER, supra note 366, at
59-61.
374. Mann is also credited with the creation of "normal" schools for teachers. Impressed with
German teachers who emphasized a child-centered style of teaching without ridicule or scolding,
Mann embraced normal schools for teacher education, which emphasized methodology over content.
GUTEK, supra note 172, at 212; KARIER, supra note 366, at 60-61. The theories underlying these
schools belonged to Johann Heinrich Pestalozzi, who embraced Rousseau's theory of the natural
rights of children. KARIER, supra note 366, at 220-224.
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Dewey, although his accomplishments were more about the creation of
modem school curriculum than about education's influence on the democratic
process. Dewey led the progressive education movement, a pragmatic
approach to education.375 This movement's importance was its emphasis on
autonomy by the use of the scientific method and its accentuation of the
individual as a member of society. Dewey emphasized the nature of
community and the manner in which an institution should satisfy its changing
needs.376 Education, for Dewey, was not an end in itself; instead, it was a
process of continued growth, a process of creating a common good.377
Dewey's instrumentalism created no dramatic changes in American education
except for the curricular adoption of portions of his scientific method of
teaching-"leaming by doing," "problem-solving," and "children's interests
and needs. 378 But, by the institution of those methods, American schools
embraced Dewey's continuing educational focus on the child as an
autonomous individual.
The function of the modem public school in America remains much as
envisioned by Jefferson and as affected by Mann and Dewey. Regardless of
the overarching educational philosophy driving any particular educational
mission, the function is to train responsible citizens.379 Such training
375. Dewey is primarily credited with the development of the philosophy of instrumentalism
and a social psychology that emphasized the transactional relationship between man and his
environment. Instrumentalism stressed the impact that social environment would have to develop
human nature. Heavily influenced by the Enlightenment, it conceived of man's nature as being
neither bad nor good but as rational. Man could change his environment just as the environment
could change him. Therefore, man could create a better social order through the use of scientific and
reflective thought. KARIER, supra note 366, at 144-45.
376. Id. at 323-26.
377. PERKINSON, supra note 369, at 208-10, 213. Dewey wrestled with the Jeffersonian
duality of education for the common citizenry and for only a specialized educational class. Dewey
saw no distinction in popular education for the masses and higher education for the leadership
classes. Furthermore, he declaimed as anathema to democracy rote instruction by utilitarian
educators. To him, education was a function of the environment by which culture could be endowed
with "intellectual, moral, and aesthetic significance." CREMIN, supra note 368, at 41-44. Dewey
himself stated:
All that society has accomplished for itself is put, through the agency of the school, at the
disposal of its future members. All its better thoughts of itself it hopes to realize through
the new possibilities thus opened to its future self. Here individualism and socialism are
at one. Only by being true to the full growth of all the individuals who make it up, can
society by any chance be true to itself.
JOHN DEWEY, THE SCHOOL AND SOCIETY 3-4 (The Univ. of Chicago Press, rev. ed. 1915).
378. GUTEK, supra note 172, at 327; see generally DEWEY, supra note 377; PERKINSON, supra
note 369, at 211-216.
379. Barry L. Bull, The Limits of Teacher Professionalization, in THE MORAL DIMENSIONS OF
TEACHING 87, 106-07 (1990). In contrast to the imperial state, which educates its citizens for mass
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implicitly, if not explicitly, requires that schools inculcate the American
cultural norm of autonomy. Education is a part of the democratic process that
trains children to be autonomous individuals as well as citizens of the larger
unit, the nation.380  Furthermore, public schools-in the existential sense-
make children's autonomy possible as a forum for exploring different options
in their growth toward fully integrated citizenship, a forum existing outside
parental authority.38' Thus, recognizing and honoring children's
constitutional rights in the classroom is as essential to their own recognition of
their civic freedoms as it is to their development toward adulthood.
Autonomy is not just taught as a democratic value; it is also a value
intrinsic to the American educational process. Teachers must be attentive to
the development of children not only as immature members of the species, but
also in their specific individuation.382 Autonomy has a fundamental role in
the motivation of children and in their educational success.38 3  Indeed,
action, the democratic state educates for individual freedom. See Franz Boas, Education,
Conformity, and Cultural Change, in EDUCATIONAL PATTERNS AND CULTURAL CONFIGURATIONS:
THE ANTHROPOLOGY OF EDUCATION 37, 38 (1976). Unfortunately, public schools do not always
understand the mass action engendered by the function of education itself and the appeal of symbols
to children. As Boas opined,
[o]ur public schools ... instill automatic reactions to symbols by means of patriotic
ceremonial, in many cases by indirect religious appeal and too often through the automatic
reactions to the behavior of the teacher that is imitated. At the same time they are
supposed to develop mind and character of the individual child. No wonder that they
create conflicts in the minds of the young.
Id; see also JOHN HOLT, ESCAPE FROM CHILDHOOD 18 (1974) ("Schools seem to me among the
most anti-democratic, most authoritarian, most destructive, and most dangerous institutions of
modem society.").
380. See, e.g., AMY GUTMANN, DEMOCRATIC EDUCATION 25 (Rev. paperback ed. 1999).
Gutman describes these two functions as "deliberative freedom and communal self-determination."
Id. at 46.
381. Woodhouse, supra note 372, at 1119.
382. Franz Alexander, Educative Influence of Personality Factors in the Environment, in
PERSONALITY IN NATURE, SOCIETY, AND CULTURE 421,433 (Clyde Kluckhohn & Henry A. Murray
eds., 2d ed. 1971). Developmental theories do have some applications to the functioning classroom
although there exists a certain disconnectedness between theory and practice-educational
psychology research is often criticized as an end in itself rather than in practical, classroom
application. Educational psychologists do give an "account" of child development, but their
mathematical formulae are less useful tools for classroom teaching than they are useful tools for
educational politics. Bolton, supra note 342, at 165, 169, 173.
383. Shelly Hymel et al., Academic Failure and School Dropout: The Influence of Peers, in
SOCIAL MOTIVATION: UNDERSTANDING CHILDREN'S SCHOOL ADJUSTMENT 313, 317 (Jaana
Juvonen & Kathryn R. Wentzel eds., 1996). One model suggests three precepts of educational
success: competence, autonomy, and relatedness. Id. Another study proposes that "autonomy-
oriented" classrooms raise children's sense of "self-competence," thereby positively affecting their
overall learning experience. Carole Ames, Achievement, Goals, and the Classroom Motivational
Climate, in STUDENT PERCEPTIONS IN THE CLASSROOM 327, 335 (Dale H. Schunk & Judith L.
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individualization is critical to primary, contemporary learning theories.384
Students do not progress without their teachers having some understanding of
their individual development.385 Individualized attention to students is crucial
to understanding their achievements, development, and traits. In addition,
identifying particular characteristics in children predicts performance,
diagnoses weaknesses, follows development, and assists in understanding
one's strengths and weaknesses with relation to a particular instructional
task.386
Thus, cultivating autonomy has both a democratic and instructional
impetus. Public schools are the delivery system for the lessons of history and
the lessons of citizenship. American history and American citizenship are
premised on the concept of liberty, which, to reach fruition, requires the
lessons of autonomy. The mission of public schools is to promote liberty and
autonomy to students, not uniformity and conformity. "If there is any fixed
star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can
prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other
matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith
therein., 387 Congruently, the actual pedagogical process requires teachers to
treat children as autonomous individuals in order to maximize the learning
experience. Intrinsic to promoting both is honoring children's constitutional
privacy.
Meece eds., 1992). Perhaps the most radical of the child-centered visions was A.S. Neill's
Summerhill. However, such radicalism is particularly criticized for its assumptions that a child is
born good and born free-when in fact he is "helpless." See, e.g., KARIER, supra note 366, at 242-
44.
384. For example, the stimulus-response theory (E. L. Thorndike, B. F. Skinner) stresses the
action of conditioning on the individual's learning, DON C. DINKMEYER, CHILD DEVELOPMENT: THE
EMERGING SELF 115 (1965), while the field theory (Kurt Lewin) stresses the wholeness of learning
as effectuated by understanding the individual learner. Id. at 116-17. The developmental theory
(Piaget) stresses the active learning processes of the individual child and requires a highly
individualized teaching approach similar to the humanistic theories (Abraham Maslow, Carl Rogers)
that center attention on the child as an "experiencing person." Id. at 117-22; WILLIAM S.
SAHAKIAN, INTRODUCTION TO THE PSYCHOLOGY OF LEARNING 365-71, 425 (2d ed. 1984)
385. A basic taxonomy identifies the interdependence of the child's past experience, the child's
motivation, and the appropriateness of the instruction. BENJAMIN S. BLOOM, HUMAN
CHARACTERISTICS AND SCHOOL LEARNING 10-11 (1976).
386. See, e.g., JOHN DEWEY & EVELYN DEWEY, SCHOOLS OF TOMORROW 101-02 (1962);
Thomas J. Shuell, Dimensions of Individual Differences, in PSYCHOLOGY AND EDUCATION: THE
STATE OF THE UNION 32, 33, 35-36 (Frank H. Farley & Neal J. Gordon eds., 1981).
387. West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637, 642 (1943)
(holding that the state may not require a Jehovah's Witness adherent to salute or to pledge allegiance
to the flag of the United States).
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V. EDUCATION PRIVACY: A CONSTITUTIONAL LIBERTY
Why the necessity for extrapolating a distinct constitutional liberty for
schoolchildren? The short answer is because nothing else protects
schoolchildren. In both major spheres of educational activity, there exist no
adequate protections, even by federal statute. In the classroom sphere,
videotaping classes for ostensible health and safety reasons is completely
unregulated. In the work-product sphere-student records-the relevant
federal statutes simply do not protect the privacy of students under the age of
seventeen. That leaves the formulation of constitutional privacy, a privacy
that protects adults and should similarly protect children.
In the absence of any real legal tradition for education privacy, the
Lawrence v. Texas liberty interest is the best resource for recognizing a
schoolchild's constitutional privacy. Unlike adult privacy, children's privacy
must encompass the "whole" of the child, not just discrete areas of privacy
usually quantified by the scholarly work on adults, such as her bodily
integrity, her decisions, and her information. The whole child attends school,
not just her body nor just her decisions nor just her information.388 Young
children do not entertain such abstract concepts in any case, and basing a
child's privacy interest on her maturational "expectations" would necessitate
the creation of differing chronological "rights," rather than establishing the
assumption of her liberty. In addition, unlike the adult working world, the
whole child is surrounded by the government function while she is in school,
a government function that includes its pedagogical mission and its agency
status. 389 Thus, a couple of general contours are required for this assumption
of liberty around which the government can embrace children in both its
pedagogical and agency functions.
As state entities, schools are the government. "By and large, public
education in our Nation is committed to the control of state and local
authorities . . . . 'The vigilant protection of constitutional freedoms is nowhere
more vital than in the community of American schools."'3 90  Although
388. These are discrete "types" of privacy that make up the whole of an individual as
categorized by legal scholars from the case law. See generally Gormley, supra note 2. Another trio
of elements of privacy has been identified by psychologists: "environmental, interpersonal, and self-
ego." Wolfe, supra note 332, at 177.
389. Schools are also increasingly exercising a police function that challenges bodily privacy.
However, the legal tradition underlying that discrete form of government intrusion is generally
recognized as the Fourth Amendment protections afforded to criminal investigations, searches, and
seizures. Although this particular type of privacy does have peculiar dynamics in the public school
setting, it is a discrete issue better addressed in the separate, Fourth Amendment literature.
390. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968) (quoting Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479,
487 (1960)).
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Americans prefer limited government, children do not experience that at
school. The all-encompassing nature of the school experience makes the wall
between the state and the individual more permeable than adult interaction
with the government. That permeability affects the nature of the
constitutional prerogatives of the school's private clients, the children.
Although children do not shed their constitutional rights at the "schoolhouse
gate,'391 a student's interest in privacy may be compromised in the public
school environment for health and safety concerns.392  Indeed, some
surveillance is necessary because of the age and status of children, as schools
act in loco parentis. But sometimes children's constitutional rights are treated
rather cavalierly for no other reason than there is no legal tradition instructing
otherwise.
Although the public nature of instruction makes children's privacy hard to
maintain, untoward incursions into that instruction are touching children
daily. Today, a public school involves both federal and state governments and
has become highly regulated. It is an all-encompassing environment with its
own rules and regulations designed to fulfill its pedagogical mission for a
vulnerable class of individuals and to fulfill its obligations as a government
agency. The crucial point is whether schools have practices and regulations-
under the guise of these missions-that interfere with students' constitutional
liberty of privacy.
Both missions affect two distinct contours of student privacy: the
classroom itself and the fruits of the classroom, student records. Privacy in
the classroom-workplace is harder to control by its very nature. More
noticeable-because of its tangible quality-are children's losses of privacy
as to their records-work product. Under either, children should not be asked
to shed so much of their constitutional rights nor allow so much governmental
interference that the assumption of privacy is forsaken. Thus, schools should
not be considered the source of privacy protections; instead their interference
in the liberty assumption should be limited by a legitimate state interest in that
interference. Students do have to compromise some of their liberty interest
because of the public and participatory nature of education. However, the
391. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969).
392. See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie County v. Earls, 536
U.S. 822, 830-31 (2002). One problem in dealing with the health and safety protection of students is
the diminution of, if not the erasure of, the lines between school as educational function, school as
governmental agency function, and school as police function. The blurring of those lines is most
insidiously accomplished in the random drug-testing cases where the "guardianship" aspect of the
school is rendered indistinguishable from the pedagogical mission. See, e.g., id. Suffice it to say that
the blurring of the line is a slippery slope in otherwise justifying or preventing governmental
intrusion under other government caretaker operations. The war on drugs has addled many an
otherwise cogent mind.
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contours of governmental interference in schools must be adjusted to
recognize the assumption of liberty as a guiding principle and not the
presumption of government regulation.
393
A. The Workplace: All the World's a Stage
The circumstance most constraining the protection of students' privacy is
that education occurs in a public setting.394 This is the workplace, and three
important behaviors must be considered in establishing constitutional privacy
in the classroom: first is receipt of knowledge; second is classroom
governance; and last is fear of public exposure, the outgrowth of childhood
secrecy and fear of stigma.
Obviously, the receipt of knowledge occurs in a "public" forum.
Cognition is the ultimate existential condition; however, it is not necessarily a
private condition. Cognition is recognized in relationship to the experience of
others; knowledge is shared.3 95 Thus, the outer borders of education privacy
must account for the learning process itself. Jefferson and Franklin did not
necessarily account for such publicity when they envisioned universal
education: The wealthy were privately tutored so only the poor attended
"formal" schools. In both systems, children scribed their lessons on
individual slates or tablets, thus maintaining a modicum of privacy in
learning. As prosaic an instrument as the blackboard-first used in American
schools between 1860 to 1869-had a profoundly erosive effect on the
privacy of instruction and began to tip the balance into the public sphere of
the classroom. These instruments of publicity made it easier for teachers to
supervise the instruction of a large number of pupils and contributed in no
small part to the uniformity, rather than individuality, of instruction. 396
Today, the situation may be even worse: Computer-assisted testing and
instruction may well lower a child's feeling of privacy, if not actually be an
393. The actual implementation of these contours of privacy is beyond the scope of this Article.
A companion Article will address specific regulatory regimes, their effectiveness, and suggestions
for the limits on government interference in this liberty interest.
394. HERBERT A. THELEN, THE CLASSROOM SOCIETY: CONSTRUCTION OF EDUCATION
EXPERIENCE 69, 77 (1981).
395. Robert Serpell, Interface between Sociocultural & Psychological Aspects of Cognition, in
CONTEXTS FOR LEARNING: SOCIOCULTURAL DYNAMICS IN CHILDREN'S DEVELOPMENT 357, 357
(Ellice A. Forman et al. eds., 1993).
396. VAN MANEN & LEVERING, supra note 4, at 160. Uniformity of instruction is also blamed
on the rising tensions between the pluralistic temperaments brought to the table by parents and by the
schools' efforts to accomplish as much academic progress in the shortest possible time. See, e.g.,
Project: Education and the Law: State Interests and Individual Rights, 74 MICH. L. REV. 1373,
1384-85 (1976).
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invasion of that privacy. 397
Second, classroom governance entails group instruction, which challenges
the individual autonomy and therefore respect for student privacy. Education
is essentially "a social process that cannot occur except through structured
interpersonal interaction within a classroom., 398  Thus, the success of a
classroom requires that children learn to live as miniature adults within a
miniature government. One of the functions of that miniature society is the
delineation of what is public for group consumption and what is private and
thus shared with the group only at the individual's discretion. 399 That too, of
course, is a function of a democratic education. Indeed, "[b]oth the individual
and society benefit when each individual achieves the academic competence
needed for political literacy and economic self-sufficiency and acquires
sufficient social awareness to assure his adherence to fundamental societal
norms.
' 00
The last feature of the public nature of schools that is intimately related to
education privacy are children's desires to avoid stigma and the related
accommodation-if any-for the privacy interests of children in evaluation
and discipline. Locke's educational philosophy advocated private shame and
public acclaim, 401 a fortunate victim of American child-centered education.
However, to some children, any public recognition-even positive-is
deleterious because "public" competition necessarily devalues those who are
not as successful as their fellows.40 2 Although achievement is a critical
397. Charles R. Tremper & Mark A. Small, Privacy Regulation of Computer-Assisted Testing
and Instruction, 63 WASH. L. REv. 841, 842 (1988). Weighed against the potential for increasing
individualization in instruction, CATI threatens privacy by problems in information-gathering,
information-maintenance, and information-interpretation. First, information registered on computer
screens loses more privacy by its greater exposure to others than do pen and paper responses.
Second, computer records themselves are at greater risk for improper disclosure. Third, the
likelihood of erroneous interpretation of results is increased because the "graders"-both the
computers and their "trainers"-are looking for more quantitative rather than qualitative information.
Id. at 844-57.
398. David W. Johnson, Social Psychology, in PSYCHOLOGY AND EDUCATION: THE STATE OF
THE UNION 265, 265 (Frank H. Farley & Neal J. Gordon eds., 1981).
399. The "socio-group" in the classroom is the "legislative" network for creating the
classroom's social order. THELEN, supra note 394, at 108.
400. Project: Education & the Law: States Interests and Individual Rights, supra note 396, at
1384-85 (internal citations omitted).
401. LOCKE, supra note 365, at 119.
402. Ames, supra note 383, at 337, 340. As one commentator has noted,
[p]rograms involving extrinsic rewards (e.g., reading incentive programs) are pervasive in
our schools. Even goals established so that everyone can earn a reward or rewards given to
recognize individual goals can have negative effects on children's feelings of competence
and interest in learning when the goals are viewed as externally imposed and when
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component of the education process, the public nature of that creative force-
a competition of sorts-has serious ramifications. As testing of children
becomes the accepted manner of publicly marking a successful school-as
opposed, perhaps, to a successful education-not only is there pressure placed
on a child to achieve for himself, but there is pressure placed on the child to
achieve for others.4 °3 These problems in balancing the private yet public
aspect of achievement also may deleteriously affect a child's self-esteem and
thus the worth of his own autonomy.
404
Schools should mirror the larger American society for which the children
are being educated and into which it is hoped they will mature.4 °5 However,
in the realities of these three public faces of education, they are often
criticized that they do not stress autonomy enough, that the organization of the
institution in general-and the classroom instruction in particular-teaches
children to become academically submissive and therefore submissive in their
recognition is made public .... Bulletin boards and charts, for example, that display
children's accomplishments, work, or progress toward goals invite social comparisons.
Even when the progress is toward an individual goal (e.g., a certain number of books to be
read), the public forum guarantees that many children will feel a negative form of
recognition. Similarly, emphasizing and rewarding perfection (e.g., charting 100% in
spelling, redoing work to attain 100%, posting of perfect papers or papers with A's)
especially in public makes ability a highly salient dimension of the classroom learning
environment. When recognition for accomplishments or progress is private, between the
teacher and the child, feelings of personal pride and satisfaction do not derive from doing
better than others.
Id. at 337-38.
403. Donald J. Rogers, How to Teach Fear, in FOUR PSYCHOLOGIES APPLIED To EDUCATION:
FREUDIAN, BEHAVIORAL, HUMANISTIC, TRANSPERSONAL 27, 27-28 (Thomas B. Roberts ed., 1975).
Resolution of this problem may require teaching children to face those fears so they can fight their
own battles. Id. at 30. Available data suggest that students who feel personally responsible for their
academic success are more likely to achieve such success. ROSS D. PARKE, READINGS IN SOCIAL
DEVELOPMENT 306 (Ross D. Parke ed., 1969). Conscious, social peer pressure aside, the fear of
straying from the group also affects the child. Just as significant is the impact of the family group on
the child's autonomy, that the child's achievement is not her own but the responsibility of the family.
Samuel Tenebaum, School Grades and Group Therapy, in FOUR PSYCHOLOGIES APPLIED TO
EDUCATION: FREUDIAN, BEHAVIORAL, HUMANISTIC, TRANSPERSONAL 39, 39-41 (Thomas B.
Roberts ed., 1975). Nonetheless, school is, to a certain extent, the conduit through which children
learn to act independently of the family unit in preparation for adulthood. Thus, a democratically run
school has a better chance of giving children the opportunity to model their roles for participation in
the larger society. DAVID CARR, PROFESSIONALISM AND ETHICS IN TEACHING 234-38 (2000).
404. Self-esteem has been postulated as a combination of two universal concepts: agency and
evaluation. Agency is one's creation of a record of experiences, or agentive encounters. Schools and
learning are early agentive encounters. On the other hand, evaluation is an "adjudication" of one's
goals and aspirations. As an early evaluator, schools also have a critical role in forming a child's
self-esteem. JEROME BRUNER, THE CULTURE OF EDUCATION 35, 37-38 (1996).
405. THELEN, supra note 394, at 69, 100. Thelen has found three "growth" themes in the
classroom: (1) adaptation, (2) participation, and (3) transcendence. Id. at 66, 69, 73.
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social and moral lives.4 °6 Indeed, recent political developments encouraging
more "standardization" of instruction and testing are likely to lead to a loss of
young Americans' autonomy necessary for critical thinking and will instead
lead to conformity.40 7 If education's role is to teach autonomous individuals,
an integral construct of a democratic developmental autonomy is children's
privacy. Of particular consequence is that:
[plarents and teachers who understand the significance and possible
consequences of secrecy and privacy realize that each child is unique,
and so each child has different tolerances and makes different room
for the place and nature of secrecy and privacy. But this pedagogical
relativism does not contradict the argument that both privacy and
secrecy are positive factors in children's development and, indeed,
throughout adult life.408
The recognition of education privacy for schoolchildren would serve three
purposes in the face of these public realities, all more practical than legal.
First, children's privacy would be an assumption rather than an afterthought in
designing, advocating, and legislating educational policy, especially policy
that seems more designed for political rather than pedagogical gain. Second,
such an assumption would have an existential impact on the civic mission of
the schools to re-emphasize the instruction of and deference to American
autonomy as a national value. Last, it would necessarily focus on students as
unique individuals with rights of autonomy that include certain considerations
of privacy. But this constitutional right faces different challenges in a
school's pedagogical mission and in a school's agency mission.
For the most part, observing children's privacy is already an integral part
of the pedagogical mission. Most American teachers are sensitive to these
privacy issues, in no small part because of the emphasis on child-centered
education in professional schools of education. Despite their best efforts,
some public acclaim and derision exists from both classmates and educators.
Some instances are avoidable; others are not by the nature of the clientele.
However, it is the rare instance when the classroom experience itself is legally
challenged as being insensitive to a child's privacy. The most notable
incident was in Owasso Independent School District No. 1-011 v. Falvo.4 09
That case involved a school district's practice of peer grading, by which
406. Constance Kamii, Toward Autonomy: The Importance of Critical Thinking and Choice
Making, 20 SCHOOL PSYCH. REV. 382, 387 (1991).
407. Id. at 387-88.
408. VAN MANEN & LEVERING, supra note 4, at 160.
409. 534 U.S. 426, 433 (2002).
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students exchange papers and classmates grade those papers. 410  The
plaintiffs children felt stigmatized by the public nature of the evaluation
process.41' Although the school district ultimately prevailed,1 2 Falvo
demonstrated that the public nature of the forum could better serve the privacy
interests of children. Indeed, the evaluation system of children and the
unrelenting need of parents to know how their children are doing in school
have been particularly savaged as failing to protect children's right to
privacy.41 3 Although children's privacy cannot be wholly protected from
public exposure in schools, certain limits on pedagogical and disciplinary
practices should be-and usually are--observed in the classroom in the
education function.
The bigger problem with privacy in the public forum is the agency, or
"government," function of schools, when the school acts as an agent of the
state or in some capacity other than its educational mission. Schools are
considered acting in loco parentis, not only to educate, but also to "govern"
children so the educational function can take place. Because of the number of
participants in the function, the nature of the function, and the immaturity of
the customers, students do not have the full range of behavioral rights that
they might otherwise exercise vis d vis the state in other venues.414 Some
privacy must be abandoned by children to guard the health and safety of other
inhabitants as well as themselves.41 5 The compromise of their Fourth
Amendment rights is the most noticeable.41 6 Although distinct from the
Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest espoused here, the high-profile erosion
of privacy under the Fourth Amendment has served to inure the public to
other legislative and judicial inroads on student privacy.41 7 Especially
410. Id. at 429.
411. Id. at 429-30.
412. Id. at 436.
413. HOLT, supra note 379, at 246-48. Holt was a proponent of children's right to learn, that
children should decide what should go into their minds. Id. at 242-43. He was also convinced that
the educational evaluation system, rather than protecting children, breeds "envy, fear, greed, and
obsessive competitiveness." Id. at 246. At least there has been some improvement since the Puritan
schools where one form of discipline for unruly children was the whipping post while another was
the death penalty! KARIER, supra note 366, at 14-15.
414. See generally Project: Education & the Law: States Interests and Individual Rights, supra
note 396, at 1455-85.
415. Generally, formulations of privacy theory exclude from protection those whose activities
will harm another. See, e.g., Buchanan, supra note 299, at 495-96.
416. See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie County v. Earls, 536
U.S. 822, 830-31 (2002).
417. A small body of law exists that treats the protection of student's bodily integrity as a right
to privacy outside the Fourth Amendment. For example, female students had a substantive due
process claim against their soccer coach for a pattern of physical and mental abuse, official acts that
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insidious is the nascent movement to provide video surveillance in
classrooms, in the name of security.418 An assumption of children's privacy
would clearly affect the practices in many schools as they act as government
agents.
Therefore, in contouring the constitutional assumption of educational
privacy, its limits to government interference can be hewn from two different
although not necessarily incompatible standards: The "regulatory" framework
of the educational-or pedagogical-function must be governed by legitimate
pedagogical concerns, and intrusions on students' privacy interests must be
reasonably related to those concerns. 41 9 The framework of privacy for this
function does not differ significantly from current educational practices.
Privacy decisions are made daily on an ad hoc basis in every classroom, in
every school across the country. Those decisions tend to be more reactive
than proactive and do not have many characteristics of governmental
interference with the liberty. On the other hand, the "regulatory" framework
of the governmental function should be circumscribed by a "legitimate state
interest. '420 As legislatures and schools take more deliberate steps to interfere
with student privacy, they should have the burden of presenting a more cogent
rationale than "because we can." As we diminish students with less respect
for their belongings and bodies, we tend to diminish their privacy interests as
a whole and their ability to act as autonomous individuals. That is certainly
not the civics lesson we should be teaching.
B. The Work-Product
The more abused aspect of educational privacy and the only aspect that
has any legal tradition is the treatment of student records. This aspect
encompasses the collection of, access to, and dissemination of student
information. Because schools are a government function, they have to keep
"shocked the conscience" of the court. Lillard v. Shelby Co. Bd. of Educ., 76 F.3d 716, 725 (6th Cir.
1996). Other cases deal with corporal punishment and bodily integrity. See, e.g., Garcia v. Miera,
817 F.2d 650, 655 (10th Cir. 1987) (holding a student has a Fourteenth Amendment right to be free
from state intrusion into personal privacy and bodily security). Another court held that a gym
teacher's forcing a special education student to strip off his torn swim trunks and to stand nude in
front of his classmates for a quarter of an hour was an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth
Amendment. Daniel S. v. Bd. of Educ., 152 F. Supp. 2d 949, 953 (N.D. Ill. 2001). And in a rather
unusual ruling, a former student stated a Fourteenth Amendment claim for invasion of privacy when
a picture of his genitalia was published in his high school yearbook. Granger v. Klein, 197 F. Supp.
2d 851, 871 (E.D. Mich. 2002).
418. See, e.g., Deborah Bulkeley, Web Cams Give Schools Eyes in All Classrooms, CHIC.
TRIB., Aug. 14, 2003, at 18.
419. See, e.g., Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 272-73 (1988) ("reasonably
related to legitimate pedagogical concerns").
420. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003).
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records, but transparency of government institutions is required to avoid
secrecy in government actions and to hold those institutions accountable to
the public. But what records do schools hold that can and should be made
public or otherwise accessible in order to fulfill their governmental function?
School records can include students' permanent grade records, disciplinary
records, psychological testing records, any retained copies of actual school
work, and standardized test scores, as well as the more mundane personal
information necessary to keep track of attendees. Unregulated access to and
disclosure of this information is highly invasive of a child's privacy, but there
is little regulation to protect those records and even less penalty if they are not
protected. Thus, the governmental function of schools can create a nearly
irreconcilable conflict between the transparency required of public institutions
and the privacy of children. And there are few legislative regimes that protect
children's records, thus accentuating the need to endow their privacy interests
with a constitutional force.
As a general principle, public recordkeeping is an important function of
local, state, and federal governments. Public records include the recordation
of vital information (birth, death, marriage) and the recordation of an
individual's contact with the government itself (driver's license, social
security, voter's registration, professional licensing).421  The kinds and
categories of information held by the government are simply overwhelming,
but most adults would deem it personal, indeed private, information. The
anticipation of privacy may be greater in some instances than others. A
particular individual's desire for privacy may be greater in some instances
than others. And the desire for privacy of particular information may be
greater in some information rather than in other. For instance, most
individuals would prefer that their tax records remain private. Some
individuals might feel more protective of privacy in their drivers' license
information than would others. And most individuals with criminal records
would prefer privacy over that information over and above any other type of
information.
In contrast to these privacy concerns is the reality of government
transparency-that records must be accessible to the public to hold the
government accountable for its actions. A government that is free and open to
421. See, e.g., Robert Gellman, Public Records, Public Policy & Privacy, 26 HUM. RTS. Q. 7, 7
(Winter 1999) (governments collect such information as names, addresses, home ownership, debt
status, value of real estate, parentage, offspring, social security numbers, height, weight, vision
correction, selected health issues, sex, date of birth, occupation, make and model of car, political
registration, voter registration, voting frequency, political contributions, etc.); Daniel J. Solove,
Access and Aggregation: Public Records, Privacy and the Constitution, 86 MINN. L. REv. 1137,
1142-45 (2002).
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the populace is essential to the functioning of the republic. 422 In addition, the
First Amendment mandates that certain government activities must be open to
the public.423 The public, however, is not so fulsome in embracing
government transparency when it becomes personal and the spectrum of
information moves from matters that necessarily take place in the public arena
to those matters that are more or less "involuntarily" gathered by the
government.424 In addition, some citizens clearly suspect that government
databases are not secure. 425  As a result of adults' concerns about making
publicly gathered, "private" information publicly available, legislatures
achieved some regulation over the collection of and access to this information.
These regulatory regimes make a distinction between two types of public
records. Some records are simply open and accessible as a matter of
government transparency. The others consist of private information that just
happens to be collected by the government. A matter of public record is a
record that has been made "public," and one generally has no "expectation of
422. Martin E. Halstuk, Shielding Private Lives from Prying Eyes: The Escalating Conflict
Between Constitutional Privacy & the Accountability Principle of Democracy, 11 COMMLAW
CONSPECTUS 71, 80-82 (2003); Solove, Access and Aggregation, supra note 421, at 1173-76.
Solove categorizes four functions of government transparency: (1) to cast "sunshine" on a
government's activities and proceedings; (2) to garner information about public officers and
candidates for public office; (3) to facilitate transactions regulated by the state; and (4) to find out
information about individuals for other purposes. Id. at 1173.
423. E.g., Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559-60 (1976) (court proceedings);
Solove, Access and Aggregation, supra note 421, at 1201-03. The First Amendment is the
progenitor of access to and use of public information under the freedom of speech and freedom of the
press. Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 495 (1975); Solove, Access and Aggregation, supra
note 421, at 1206. The First Amendment right to know is also touted as a bar to privacy concerns in
data regulation, or the information exchange in the private sector. See, e.g., Fred H. Cate & Robert
Litan, Constitutional Issues in Information Privacy, 9 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 35, 49-
57 (2002); Singleton, supra note 249, at 94, 152; Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech & Information
Privacy: The Troubling Implications of A Right to Stop People from Speaking About You, 52 STAN.
L. REV. 1049, 1053 (2000); but see Los Angeles Police Dept. v. United Reporting Publg. Corp., 528
U.S. 32, 36-37 (1999) (A private investigator could not bring a First Amendment facial attack on a
state statute requiring that a requester of arrestees' addresses declare the information will not be used
for marketing, scholarly, journalistic, or political purposes). However, the Fourth Amendment
privacy right trumped the press's First Amendment right when reporters recorded events for purely
private purposes during the execution of a warrant. Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 612-13 (1999).
And the First Amendment is no shield to charges of distribution of child pornography. See, e.g.,
New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 759 (1982).
424. Lillian R. BeVier, Information about Individuals in the hands of Government: Some
Reflections on Mechanisms for Privacy Protection, 4 WM. & MARY BILL RIGHTS J. 455, 469 (1995).
425. An even worse problem occurs when governments profit from the sale of public lists of
information. Susan E. Gindin, Lost & Found in Cyberspace: Informational Privacy in the Age of the
Internet, 34 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 1153, 1162-63, 1173-74 (1997); Mike Hatch, The Privatization of
Big Brother: Protecting Sensitive Personal Information from Commercial Interests in the 21st
Century, 27 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1457, 1476-77 (2001).
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privacy" in such information.426 The line is sometimes blurred between the
two, but both can be subject to unwanted disclosure and access. After nearly
200 years of data collection, Congress finally enacted a regulatory regime
over personal information collected by the federal government with the
Privacy Act of 1974,427 which limits a federal agency to collecting only as
much information as it needs to accomplish its purpose.428  However, the
Privacy Act does not apply to public schools. Neither do the restrictions
under the Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA"), which has regularized
access to government records while promoting transparency of the
government function.429 Thus, children's privacy has not been embraced with
as much enthusiasm by legislatures as adults' privacy interests in controlling
the permeability of the government system of collecting and disclosing private
information.
Some general and some explicit privacy protections to student records
have been afforded by states with similar open-record laws.430 These open-
426. Cox Broad. Corp., 420 U.S. at 494-95 (1975) (father of a deceased rape victim sued for
invasion of privacy when a reporter disclosed her name; the reporter found the information only after
examining the rapists' indictments). "Public records by their very nature are of interest to those
concerned with the administration of government, and a public benefit is performed by the reporting
of the true contents of the records by the media." Id. at 495.
427. Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-579, 88 Stat. 1896 (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552a
(2003)).
428. Solove, Access and Aggregation, supra note 421, at 1168. Enacted because of concerns
that increased computerization would make such personal information widely disseminated, the
Privacy Act was intended to balance the needs of government functioning and personal control over
private information. Todd Robert Coles, Comment, Does the Privacy Act of 1974 Protect Your Right
to Privacy? An Examination of the Routine Use Exemption, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 957, 965 (1991)
(includes significant background and legislative history on the Act). The Privacy Act is framed upon
fair information practices for the use, collection and dissemination of "personal information"
collected by the government. It provides four specific safeguards to an individual's information held
by an agency. First, the agency is not allowed to release the information except by written request or
with prior written consent of the individual. Second, individuals may access and amend the files kept
by the government. Third, the agency must restrict the collection, maintenance, and use of the
information. And last, it provides a private right of action. Id. at 965-69; BeVier, supra note 424, at
478-85.
429. FOIA is a regulatory regime that serves the following three purposes: "first and most
important, ensure public access to the information necessary to evaluate the conduct of government
officials; second, ensure public access to information concerning public policy; and third, protect
against secret laws, rules and decisionmaking." Fred H. Cate, D. Annette Fields, & James K.
McBain, The Right to Privacy and the Public 's Right to Know: The "Central Purpose" of the
Freedom of Information Act, 46 ADMIN. L. REV. 41, 45-46, 65 (1994). For a private citizen to
request government information, she must "reasonably describe" the agency records she seeks. Then
the agency has a finite period of time to comply with the request unless the record is statutorily
exempt from disclosure. Id. at 48-49; see generally BeVier, supra note 424, at 485-496.
430. A compendium of those state statutes limiting access to personal (or confidential)
information can be found at Bruce D. Goldstein, Comment, Confidentiality and Dissemination of
Personal Information: An Examination of State Laws Governing Data Protection, 41 EMORY L.J.
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record laws govern the disclosure of and access to state-collected information,
just as FOIA does for the federal government. 431  For example, Illinois's
Freedom of Information Act exempts "files and personal information
maintained with respect to ... students. 'A32  Wisconsin's exempts "pupil
records" from disclosure.4 33 Others would probably be interpreted to protect
student information from public disclosure simply because "personal
information" is protected by the statute.4 34 However, the reality is that
children's privacy-for the most part-is not given the same legislative
regulation and respect as adult privacy interests.
What meager legal tradition does exist specifically for children's privacy
is of very recent vintage. Congress made an attempt to regularize some
privacy practices in the collection and dissemination of student information
with the 1974 passage of FERPA.435 With FERPA, sometimes called "the
Buckley Amendment," most schools and administrators-and perhaps
parents-had taken some comfort in the privacy protections ostensibly offered
by this statute. FERPA is a mechanism for penalizing education institutions
that receive federal funds if they violate certain standards for the disclosure of
and access to student information. The statute and its detailed regulations set
out a list of circumstances under which a school may lose its federal funding
for having a "policy or practice of permitting the release of education
records. 4 36  Pursuant to these guidelines, most school districts and their
administrators established procedures to protect education records from
disclosure. Although there were a few disputes over the actual nature of the
protected education records, most people assumed that FERPA granted some
sort of wide-ranging and generalized privacy protection to schoolchildren
over certain information generated by the children and by the schools
themselves.
1185 (1992).
431. See generally Project: Government Information and the Rights of Citizens, 73 MIcH. L.
REv. 971, 1172-73 (1975).
432. 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 140/7(1)(b)(i) (2004); Chi. Trib. Co. v. Bd. of Educ., 773 N.E.2d 674,
682 (Ill. Ct. App.), appeal denied 786 N.E.2d 181 (111. 2002) (school board properly denied reporter's
FOIA request concerning personal information of over 1 million students, including school, room
number, medical statute, special education status, race, lunch status, grade point average, date of
birth, and standardized test scores).
433. WIS. STAT. § 19.36(2) (2002); State ex rel. Blum v. Bd. of Educ. Sch. Dist. of Johnson
Creek, 565 N.W.2d 140, 144 (Wis. Ct. App. 1997) (interim pupil grades are pupil records exempt
from disclosure in a student dispute over GPAs and scholarship selection).
434. Goldstein, supra note 430, at 1217-80 (appendices).
435. 20 U.S.C. § 1232g (2003).
436. Id. § 1232g(b)(1).
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That notion evaporated in Gonzaga University v. Doe,43 v when the Court
determined that FERPA does not unambiguously confer a privacy right to a
person whose education records have been "wrongfully" disclosed.438
Without such statutory right, that person has no cause of action for a violation
of his civil rights under § 1983,439 much less an independent right of action
under the language of the statute itself.440 FERPA has no specific "rights-
creating" language, and thus evinces insufficient congressional intent to create
such right 44' There still remain the financial penalties assessed by the U.S.
Department of Education against a school that has a policy or practice of
disclosing records, but that is small comfort for the individual student whose
records are disclosed without permission. As a result, what little legislative
protection existed has pretty much evaporated for children's education
privacy in their records.
Furthermore, FERPA's limits to collection and access do not really solve
the government's transparency responsibilities under competing statutes that
mandate disclosure of student information in a way that makes that
information more vulnerable than adult information. For instance, certain
information--defined as "directory information"-is deemed disclosable per
se by FERPA itself and not a legislative violation of children's privacy.
442
Other recent legislative changes have made it easier for non-school agencies
to access student records without the same safeguards afforded adult
information: under the IDEA, student records can be turned over to law
enforcement without a warrant, 443 and the military has virtually unlimited
access to certain personal information of all students over the age of fifteen.444
In addition, as part of government reporting, all sorts of student records--
usually statistical although not personally identifiable-must be available for
public inspection and consumption. And those concerns do not even begin to
address the abuses in disclosure and dissemination.
An education privacy of constitutional dimensions would certainly help
rein in the cavalier treatment of schools with regard to student records and the
437. 536 U.S. 273 (2002).
438. Id. at 286.
439. 20 U.S.C. § 1983 (2003).
440. Doe, 536 U.S. at 282-83.
441. Id. at 286-87. Legislative history, of course, tells a slightly different story. See, e.g., 120
Cong. Rec. 14549, 14581, 14583 (May 14, 1974); 121 Cong. Rec. 13990 (May 13, 1975); PERSONAL
PRIVACY IN AN INFORMATION SOCIETY: THE REPORT OF THE PRIVACY PROTECTION STUDY
COMMISSION, PERSONAL PRIVACY IN AN INFORMATION SOCIETY 412 (1977).
442. 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(a)(5)(A) (2003); 34 C.F.R. § 99.31 (2003).
443. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(9)(B) (2003).
444. Id. § 7908.
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governmental function. The assumption of constitutional privacy in student
information, and particularly in student records, would govern the legislative
mandates for disclosure. All legislative interference-collection,
dissemination, and access-would be first measured against a legitimate state
interest in the interference that reins in the agency function of schools, not
against some vague pedagogical concern that constrains the educational
function. As a measure of that legitimate state interest, violations of such
legislation would carry civil rights penalties or injunctive relief, not just some
ephemeral and ineffectual threat to penalize a school that has a pattern or
practice of disclosure. The onus would be on the offender, not on the
offended.
The bedrock of that constitutional privacy for student records is the
principle that the vast majority of information concerning children that is
collected by schools-in whatever form-is not only not a public record but
also not a government record. Everything that a child does in school is, or
could be, a school record. This workplace is the site of all the child's work-
product. But that work-product is not like the work-product of the adult
government employee who generates product for the employer and thus
belongs to the government. The child, instead, generates this information for
herself. Therefore, except for very limited information-such as vital
information for accounting for daily attendance and contacting parents and
information created by a teacher as part of her teaching function-these
records belong to the child, not the government. Schools are only the curators
for most of this information. Schools are not the owners; the children are.
Consequently, general principles that legislatures usually consider concerning
the collection, disclosure, and access to that information have no corollary in
adult privacy protections.
For example, one type of a public record presupposes an adult's volition
in her participation in the government function. Mortgaging a house as well
as involvement in a public court proceeding requires recognition of the public
function of the recordkeeping process or that the process necessarily takes
place in a public arena. Another type of public record presupposes slightly
less volition, like employment records of government employees, financial
information given to the Internal Revenue Service, and the like. But these
adult record issues really do not fit the problem of children's education
records. To the extent that students attend school "involuntarily" by reason of
compulsory attendance statutes, the collection of their information by the
government is by no means a voluntary "transaction" between the individual
and the government-either state or federal-thereby necessitating
considerations different than those applied to adults. In addition, work-
product can be more a source of embarrassment, stigma, and other unwanted
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attention for children than adult work-product would be to their parents.
Thus, schoolchildren's privacy concerns are not the same as adult privacy
concerns and should be treated differently. The best form of recognition is the
assumption of constitutional liberty upon which government regulation can be
shaped rather than vice versa. The dichotomy of the government function of
the school as government probably has not entered the minds of most parents
and students because, to the extent they have delegated the educational
function to schools, they have also delegated the responsibility to respect their
children's privacy. In the embrace of the government, students' privacy
interests can best be protected by constitutional recognition. Within this
public setting must still remain a private domain, not only for the creation of
the autonomous individual, but also for the memorialization of those matters
that mark the achievements, discipline, and other indices that set out not just
educational progress, but indicia of the individual herself. Schools are
collection machines and that must continue for the pedagogical function.
However, that does not make this information disclosable or accessible as
government records. Information of this nature is kept for a variety of
reasons, by a variety of people, in a variety of places, and for a variety of
periods. Permanent academic records of achievement and test scores are the
ones most easily identifiable by the public. But such information will also
include family histories, medical histories and information, disciplinary
reports, periodic academic reports, and the like. Much of this information is
extremely personal to students, and perhaps to their families. The fact that
this information is held by the government does not, ipso facto, make it a
government record, much less a public record. Instead, it is a private record,
held in trust, and the governments should be limited in their interference with
their privacy as a constitutional liberty under the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments.
VI. CONCLUSION: "THE CHILD IS FATHER TO THE MAN" '4 4 5
With the death of FERPA and until a better recognition of children's
privacy interests with effective legislative prohibition, only "historical"
tradition-observed perhaps more by teachers in the education function rather
than administrators in the government function-is the bulwark between
children's privacy and public disclosure.446 Indeed, since 1929, the Code of
445. Gerard Manley Hopkins.
446. Unfortunately, the guidance provided to teachers on the handling of this information is
limited. See, e.g., ROBERT W. RICHEY, PLANNING FOR TEACHING: AN INTRODUCTION TO
EDUCATION 168-69 (6th ed. 1979); but see JOHN SALVIA & JAMES E. YSSELDYKE, ASSESSMENT IN
SPECIAL AND REMEDIAL EDUCATION 433-42 (1978).
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Ethics espoused by the National Education Association has included a right of
confidentiality.
447
To teachers, this charge was-and is-the equivalent of a privilege.448
However, little else stands between children in their private state and children
as a public customer in the absence of constitutional recognition of their
liberty interest in education privacy.
Measuring the current governmental intrusions against this assumption of
education privacy indicates how little recognition has been given to that
assumption.449  And with so little recognition comes little motivation to
protect it. Constitutional recognition would obviously motivate more schools
and regulatory agencies to get a better grasp on the problem through the worst
of all mechanisms, litigation. At best, litigation would result in minimal
damages and attorney fees. Because the most effective remedy is prohibitory
or mandatory injunctive relief, the education system would be better served
to simply rethink its own, even local, initiatives. More effective, more
respectful regulatory regimes from both legislatures and local school boards
would be neither difficult nor onerous. Most educators understand the need
for privacy and respect that privacy as part of the pedagogical function. The
government itself seems less attuned to children's privacy than it does to
privacy in general. If the child is the father to the man, a renewed interest in
children's privacy may change government's interference in privacy in
general. And King Tantalus's travails may be over.
447. First Principle: The primary obligation of the teaching profession is to guide children,
youth and adults in the pursuit of knowledge and skills, to prepare them in the ways of democracy,
and to help them to become happy, useful, self-supporting citizens. The ultimate strength of the
nation lies in the social responsibility, economic competence, and moral strength of the individual
American.
In fulfilling the obligations of this first principle the teacher will -
5. Respect the right of every student to have confidential information about himself withheld
except when its release is to authorized agencies or is required by law.
ALBERT J. HUGGETT & T.M. STINNETT, PROFESSIONAL PROBLEMS OF TEACHERS 247, 249 (1956);
see also www.nea.org/code.html (last visited June 21, 2003).
448. The only exception to that privilege is to consult with colleagues and authorized agencies
to deal with the educational problems of the individual child. HUGGETT & STINNETT, supra note
447, at 261.
449. Those specific measures are better developed in a companion piece along with suggestions
for creating local privacy regimes.
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